

**POLITICS
AND CONFLICTS
IN AFRICA**

Degefe Kebede Gemechu

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AND CONFLICTS
IN AFRICA**

Origin, Processes
and Consequences

OLSZTYN, POLAND, 2024

Peer reviewed

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Introduction

For over 20 years, I have focused on African matters, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. This monograph reflects the findings of my research in this region. While the primary emphasis is on political issues, it also addresses economic, social, and cultural factors that play a significant role.

The book comprises seven chapters, each addressing specific issues. The first three chapters explore topics relevant to Africa as a whole, examining both historical contexts and current situations. The following four chapters concentrate on the challenges faced by the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia and its adjacent nations. The investigations take into account both domestic matters and international contexts.

Each chapter concludes with a summary that offers a comprehensive evaluation of the topic discussed.

The first chapter, titled “The Problem of Corruption, Poverty, and Military Expenditure in Africa”, highlights the prevalence of poverty and corruption across the continent, along with the measures being undertaken to address these challenges. These issues are framed within the context of rising military expenditures in Africa.

The second chapter, titled “Religion and Its Radicalization in the Politics of African States”, explores the dynamics of state religious policy and the threat of radicalism in Africa. It examines how the state interacts with religion and its influence on religious realities. This chapter also addresses key religious-ethical issues, including the relationship between Islam and Christianity and their connection to democracy and human rights in Africa.

Following this, the chapter titled “Political Leadership and Conflict Over Power in Africa” delves into the interplay between political leadership and conflict across the continent. It discusses the nuances of the

struggle for power, including issues related to its acquisition, maintenance, and succession.

The subsequent chapter entitled “Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: An Attempt at Explanation” analyses the origins, causes, and impacts of armed conflict in this region, with a particular focus on Ethiopia’s experiences.

In the fifth chapter, titled “Ethiopia as a Regional Power: The Context of Relations with Neighboring States” the author examines Ethiopia’s role within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. After outlining the theoretical framework, the chapter investigates Ethiopia’s efforts to stabilize the region through reconciliation, the competition for regional leadership between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the involvement of Ethiopian peacekeepers in Sudan.

The following chapter, titled “The Essence of Ethiopia’s Border Disputes and Conflicts with Neighbouring States” builds upon the previous discussion. It examines the complexities of Ethiopia’s border issues through the lens of the Ethiopian-Somali war over territorial claims, the two Ogaden wars, and the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict regarding borders.

The final chapter, “Conflicts of Interest Related to the Expropriation and Sale of Land to Foreigners in Ethiopia,” addresses crucial contemporary challenges facing the nation. It particularly highlights the significant and growing influence of foreign nations and multinational corporations in seizing Ethiopian land and displacing existing communities.

The monograph wraps up with a Bibliography that lists the sources and studies referenced throughout the work.

Degefe Kebede Gemechu

Chapter 1

The Problem of Corruption, Poverty and Military Expenditure in Africa

Introduction

Africa is one of the richest continents in terms of natural resources. However, its society is among the poorest. This poverty is due to a number of factors, the main one being state mismanagement. This is a continent where the ruling class enjoys a luxurious life, while ordinary citizens starve. Survey results show that Africa loses \$148 billion annually due to corruption. National assets are treated as private property by many leaders. The most important task of those in power is to maximize the duration of their rule and watch out for their own interests. Spending on developing a comprehensive security system by strengthening the military, police or security services becomes a priority. Political corruption and military spending directly or indirectly have a negative impact on poverty eradication in Africa. To a great extent, the responsibility for deepening poverty lies not only with the leaders but also with the banking system of Western countries cooperating and storing money stolen by African leaders.

Practically, the action of many leaders shows that the declarations made to fight poverty in recent decades, seem unrealistic. Extortion of natural resources as well as treasury assets for their own purposes has been a serious impediment to development since the post-colonial era. This article attempts to analyse the relationship between poverty, political corruption and the priorities of state-run teams on expanding the

system's security mechanisms, ignoring social goals using the example of some African countries.

Corruption

Various mass media such as newspapers, radio and television often publicize the problem of poverty in Africa. In contrast, they lack information on the contribution of banking systems and financial institutions located in rich countries. They attract hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars stolen from poor countries by corrupt African leaders, who can be counted as one of the causes of poverty.

According to Lord Aikins Adusei, banking systems in some Western countries specific to Switzerland, France, the Island of Jersey in the UK, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Austria, the US and elsewhere accept money without checking the source of the money, which encourages the operation of corrupt African leaders.

UN sources confirm that some \$148 billion stolen annually by Africa's political elite and top government officials goes to European and North American banks. This "paradise" for the corrupt, remains a mystery for many years. The paradox is that Western countries, for whom this situation in turn is no secret, tolerate this type of activity and do not react to it accordingly, while having discussions about poverty and aid for Africa.

Reality shows that the funds stolen and exported by the leaders of some African countries are far greater than the development aid provided by Western countries. Demonstrating the extent of corruption in Africa on a country-by-country basis is a difficult task due to the obfuscation of such activities by the perpetrators. However, it is possible to give a partial account of some of the continent's most corrupt leaders and the sums of money they have stolen.

Nigerian President Sani Abacha¹ during his reign from 1993-1998, officially defrauded the public treasury of \$4 billion, while accord-

¹ See: N. Kofele-Kale, *The International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes: Holding State Officials Individually Liable for Acts of Fraudulent Enrichment*, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2006, pp. 193-194.

ing to unofficial figures between \$12 billion and \$16 billion. After his death in 1998, investigative bodies from Nigeria, Europe and the US discovered as many as 130 bank accounts where President S. Abacha hid the stolen public money. Huge sums of money of high importance to the country's development and the fight against poverty ended up in President S. Abacha's personal accounts in the following banks, the main ones in Western countries²:

Australia and New Zealand Banks Group, ANZ, London Branch;

- ANZ, New York;
- ANZ, Frankfurt;
- Bank Len, Zürich;
- Bankers Trust Company, London;
- Bankers Trust Company, Frankfurt;
- Bankers Trust Company, New York;
- Banque Barring Brothers, Geneva;
- Bank Liechtenstein A. G., Vaduz;
- Barclays Bank, New York;
- Barclays Bank, London;
- Banque Edouard Constant, Geneva;
- Banque Nationale de Paris, Geneva;
- Banque Nationale de Paris, London;
- Banque Nationale de Paris, Basle;
- Citibank N. A. London;
- Citibank N. A. New York;
- Citibank N. A. Luxembourg;
- Citibank Zurich;
- Credit Lyonnais, New York;
- Credit Suisse, New York;
- Credit Suisse, Geneva;
- Credit Suisse, Zurich;
- Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Jersey;
- FIBI Bank (Schweiz) A. G., Zürich;
- First Bank of Boston, London;

² A. Adusei, *Hiding Africa's Looted Funds: Silence of Western Media*, <http://www.modernghana.com/news/207688/1/hiding-africas-looted-funds-silence-of-western-med.html>.

- Goldman Sachs and Company, Zürich;
- Gothard Bank, Geneva;
- LGT Liechtenstein Bank, Vaduz;
- Liechtenstein Landesbank, Vaduz;
- M. M. Warburg and Company, Luxembourg;
- M. M. Warburg and Company, Zurich;
- M. M. Warburg and Company, Hamburg;
- Merrill Lynch Bank, New York;
- Merrill Lynch Bank, Geneva;
- Midland Bank, London;
- National Westminster Bank, London;
- Paribus, London; Paribus, Geneva;
- Royal Bank of Scotland, Leeds;
- Standard Bank London Limited, London;
- UBS AG, Zurich; UBS AG, Geneva;
- Union Bancaire Privee, Geneva;
- Union Bancaire Privee, London; London Branch;
- Verwaltungs und Privatbank A. G., Vaduz.

Between November 12, 1993 and 1998, President S. Abacha robbed the national treasury on an unprecedented scale. From the Central Bank of Nigeria, at various times he made transfers of foreign currency to private accounts he had set up in various Western banks. On March 25, 1994 alone, S. Abacha made a transfer of \$37.6 million from the Central Bank of Nigeria to his own account. Ismaila Gwarzo, a close associate of President S. Abacha, testifying in the corruption case, among other things, stated that he allegedly in part sent his representatives to the bank to prepare a transfer of \$456 million and £232 million to President Abacha, indicating a specific date for the transfer³:

- February 1995 - \$4 million and £2 million
- July 8, 1995 - \$5 million and £2 million plus £2 million in traveler's checks
- December 29, 1995 - \$5 million

³ *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report Nigeria 2004*, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/ANTIC/docs/Resources/Country%20Profiles/Nigeria/TransparencyInternational_NIS_Nigeria.pdf.

- March 28, 1996 - S. Abacha demanded the payment of \$5 million and £3 million, but due to a shortage of foreign currency at the central bank, only \$3.8013 million was paid to him; he was very upset about this, but eventually received the money.
- May 29, 1996 - S. Abacha demanded \$5 million and £5 million; due to lack of British currency, he was issued \$12.5 million.
- June 20, 1996 - \$30 million and £5 million
- August 20, 1996 - \$30 million and £15 million.
- September 24, 1996 - \$50 million
- September 30, 1996 - \$50 million and £3 million
- October 14, 1996 - \$5 million
- November 11, 1996 - \$5 million and £3 million
- February 18, 1997 - \$6 million
- February 28, 1997 - \$3 million
- March 3, 1997 - \$3.27 million
- March 6, 1997 - \$1.21 million
- April 22, 1997 - \$60 million
- April 28, 1997 - \$60 million and £30 million
- June 30, 1997 - \$4.9 million
- July 9, 1997 - \$5 million and £2 million
- August 8, 1997 - \$10 million
- October 18, 1997 - \$12.3 million
- October 21, 1997 - £5.88 million
- October 23, 1997 - £14.76
- October 29, 1997 - £11.76 million
- November 14, 1997 - \$10 million
- November 26, 1997 - \$24 million
- December 10, 1997 - \$24 million
- December 18, 1997 - £6.15 million

The list of corrupt Nigerian presidents and high officials who have “looted” the national treasury is long. Below is the stolen money held in four Western European banks⁴.

⁴ Source: <http://ojombo.com/v2/2010/10/03/looted-money-discovered-in-foreign-banks>; National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report Nigeria 2004, <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/ANTIC/docs/Resources/Country%20Profiles/Nigeria/TransparencyInternationa>.

Table 1. Nigerian presidents and top officials who had private bank accounts in London, Switzerland, the U.S. and Germany

Name of Nigerian presidents (account holders)	London (GBP)	Switzerland (USD)	USA (USD)	Germany (DEM)
Ibrahim Babangida	6.25 billion	7.41 billion	2.00 billion	9.00 billion
Abdulsalami Abubakar	1.31 billion	2.33 billion	-	800 million
Mike Akhigbe	1.24 billion	2.42 billion	671 million	1.00 billion
Jerry Useni	3.04 billion	2.01 billion	1.01 billion	900 million
Alh Ismaila Gwarzo	1.03 billion	2.00 billion	1.3 billion	700 million
Alh Umaru Dikko	4.5 billion	1.4 billion	700 million	345 million
Paul Ogwuma	300 million	1.42 billion	200 million	500 million
Sani Abacha	9.01 billion	4.09 billion	800 million	3.01 million
Mohammed Abacha	300 million	1.2 billion	150 million	535 million
Abdulkadir Abacha	700 million	1.21 billion	900 million	471 million
Alhaji Wada Nas	600 million	1.32 billion	-	300 million
Tom Ikimi	400 million	1.39 billion	152 million	371 million
Dan Etete	1.12 billion	1.03 billion	400 million	1.72 billion
Don Etibet	2.5 billion	1.06 billion	1.06 billion	361 million
Al Mustapha	600 million	1,001 billion	-	210 million
Anthony Ani	2.9 billion	1.09 billion	360 million	1.66 billion
Bashir Dalhatu	2.3 billion	1,001 billion	161million	1.43 million
Mohammed Wushshi	700 million	1.301 billion	-	-
Alhasan Adamu	300 million	200 million	700 million	-
T.Y. Danjuma	300 million	200 million	700 million	-
Shaya Bamayi	120 million	800 million	-	

Source: <http://ojombo.com/v2/2010/10/03/looted-money-discovered-in-foreign-banks/>.

Note that this list does not reflect the actual amount of money stolen from Africa by the leaders in power. Data from different sources may be contradictory. Over the years, this data may change further until the actual size of the sums stolen and exported by African leaders is ascertained.

Directly or indirectly running big business through the ruling party is one way for those in power to launder money.

The Ethiopian Economy is controlled by the ruling party, the right rebels who seized power from 1991 to 2018. After coming to power, they legally registered a company called REST, which was the rebels' financial backer. Four years after seizing power in Ethiopia, this com-

pany changed its name to EFFORT (*Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray*), turning into a business empire owned by people in power⁵. The initial capital of this company is estimated at 2.7 billion birr (a little less than \$1 billion at the time).

Companies owned by the ruling party controlled all strategic economic sectors, including agriculture, banking systems, natural resource extraction, imports and exports, construction, insurance, communications and all other important business fields. All this was controlled by the TPLF (*Tigray Liberation Front*) the party representing the Tigray ethnic group.

The World Bank and other observers describe such action as inappropriate. The parleying of business rulers on such a scale has a negative social effect. Business is politicized and creates discriminatory tendencies. They have privileged access to contracts, loans, tax discounts, administrative processing and many other preferences. Those who are not affiliated with the ruling party have no such opportunity.

Table 2. Companies and firms owned by the ruling party (Tigray Liberation Front)

Companies with investment capital from 20,000,000 million Birr				
Company/Company Name	Year (according to the Ethiopian Calendar)	Initial capital	Headquarters	President of the company
Selam Transport	1995	10.000000 Birr	Mekele	Arkebe Ekubay
Segel Construction	1995	10,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Araya Zerihun
Mega Net Corp	1995	10,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Alemseged Gebreamlak
Hitech Park Axion Association	1995	10,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Shimelis Kinde
Fana Democracy plc	1995	6,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Negash Sahle
Express Transit	1995	10,000,000 Birr	Mekele	G/selassie Gidey

⁵ E. Poluha, *The Power of Continuity: Ethiopia through the Eyes of its Children*, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala 2004, p. 186.

Table 2 – cont.

Companies with investment capital from 20,000,000 million Birr				
Company/Company Name	Year (according to the Ethiopian Calendar)	Initial capital	Headquarters	President of the company
Ethio Rental Axion Association	1995	10,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Atkilit Kiros
Dilate Brewery	1995	15,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Kahsay Te-woldeTedla
Dessaiegn Caterinary	1995	15,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Dr. Maru Erdaw
Addis Consultancy House	1995	10,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Sibhat Nega
Birhane Building Construction	1995	10,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Bereket Mazengiya
Companies with investment capital from 20-49 million Birr				
Sheba Tannery Factory Axion Assoc.	1995	40,000,000 Birr	Wukro	Abadi Zemu
Meskerem Investment	1995	40,000,000 Birr	Axum	Tewodros Ayes Tesfaye
Africa Insurance Axion Association	1995	30,000,000 Birr	A. Ababa	Yohannes Ekubay
Global Auto Sparepart	1995	26,000,000 Birr	A.Ababa	Teklebirhan Habtu
Experience Ethiopia Travel	1995	26,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Tony Hiki
Addis Engineering Consultancy	1995	25,000,000 Birr	A.Ababa	Arkebe Ekubay
Hiwot Agriculture Mechanization	1995	25,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Yohannes Kidane
Berhe Chemical Axion	1995	25,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Abadi Zemu
Rahwa Yebegina Fiyel Export	1995	25,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Yassin Abdurahman
Star Pharmaceuticals	1995	25,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Arkebe Ekubay
Tesfa Livestock	1995	20,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Yohannes Kidane
Companies with investment capital of Birr 50,000,000 million and above				
Almedan Garment Factory	1995	660,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Abadi Zemu
Mesfin Industrial Company	1995	500,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Arkebe Ekubay

Table 2 – cont.

Companies with investment capital of Birr 50,000,000 million and above				
Company/Company Name	Year (according to the Ethiopian Calendar)	Initial capital	Headquarters	President of the company
Mesob Cement Factory	1995	240,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Abadi Zemu
Almeda Textile Factory	1995	180,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Abadi Zemu
Sur Construction	1995	150,000,000 Birr	A.Ababa	Arkebe Ekubay
Trans Ethiopia	1995	100,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Shimelis Kinde
Dedebit Saving & Loan	1995	60,000,000 Birr	Mekele	Atkilit Kiros
Ezana Mining Development	1995	55,000,000 Birr	A.Ababa	Tewodros H. Berhe
Addis Pharmaceuticals Production	1995	53,000,000 Birr	A.Ababa	Abadi Zemu
Tana Trading House Axion Association	1995	50,000,000 Birr	A.Ababa	Sibhat Nega

Source: *EFFORT and The TPLF Business Empire*, http://www.ginbot7.org/Statement/Effort_TPLF_business_Empire.htm.

The sums shown in the table are initial capitals, while they were later expected to multiply. There were also many other companies operating in the market, owned by people in power. Their initial capital was not known, including Dashen Beer Factory, Saba Emnebered, Express Ethio Travel Service, Guna Trade Services, Tigray Development PLC, Biftu Dinsho, Computer Networking Technology, Oromia Credit Bank, Adwa Flour Factory, Trans Ethiopia, Sebhat Nega PLC, Dima Honey Processing plant, Aberdele Animal Export Company, Maichew Particle Board, Zeleke Agricultural, Mechanization PLC, Tikur Abbay Transport, Beruk Tesfa Plastic, Shala Advertisement, Wegagen Bank, Walta Industry, National Geo-Textile, Alage Forest Products, Martha poultry. A total of sixty-six of the country's most important companies were owned by the Tigray ethnic group (who controlled the country's power apparatus)⁶.

⁶ *EFFORT and The TPLF Business Empire*, <http://abbaymedia.com/News/?p=2683>.

In May 1997, a French weekly published and revealed stolen public assets by leaders of the following African countries, according to this:

President Sani Abacha (Nigeria) - \$20 billion⁷

- President H. Boigny (Ivory Coast) - \$6 billion
- President Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) - \$4 billion
- President Ibrahim Babangida (Nigeria) \$5 billion
- President Mousa Traore (Mali) - \$2 billion.
- President Henri Bedie (Ivory Coast) - \$300 million.
- President Denis N'guesso (Congo) - \$200 million.
- President Omar Bongo (Gabon) - \$80 million.
- President Paul Biya (Cameroon) - €70 million.
- President M. Haile Mariam (Ethiopia) - \$30 million.
- President Hissène Habré (Chad) - \$3 million.

Further research identifies more leaders - millionaires and billionaires. This includes former Liberian President Charles Taylor, President Gabassing Eyadema of Togo, former Ghanaian dictator Jerry Rawlings John and the late Liberian President Samuel Doe as well as many other former and still in power leaders and government officials in Africa⁸.

Former Tanzanian President Frederick Chiluba has also been charged with corruption⁹. One of the high-profile pieces of evidence in the case was a purchase he made during his stay in Geneva. He spent \$500,000 at one time in a fashion store, including buying ties, pyjamas and more than 100 pairs of shoes. At the time, his salary was no more than \$10,000 a month¹⁰.

⁷ There is a discrepancy between the data on the money defrauded by President S. Abacha, as well as other leaders. This discrepancy is due to the difficulty of different researchers to determine more precisely the amount of stolen money.

⁸ *\$140 billion stolen from Africa*, http://kenya.rcbowen.com/talk_old/viewtopic.php?id=149386; K. Hinterseer, *The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context*, Kluwer Law International, New York 2002, p. 61.

⁹ *Zambia's Ex-President Chiluba Acquitted*, <http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/52393,news-comment,news-politics,zambias-ex-president-frederick-chiluba-acquitted>.

¹⁰ *Africa Reportedly Loses Annually 25% of the Total GDP' to Corruption*, http://www.biyokulule.com/view_content.php?articleid=2312.

Gabon's President Omar Bongo was one of the most corrupt leaders. Gabon is a small country with a population of 1.4 million. After four decades of billions of dollars in oil exports, per capita GDP income was less than \$2 a day¹¹.

During his 41-year reign, O. Bongo shamelessly plundered national assets, primarily oil revenues. O. Bongo treated Gabon like a private estate. He considered everything inside the country's borders to be his personal property. The income from the oil reserve, estimated at 2.5 billion barrels, was a guarantee of his power. Bongo was one of the richest men in the world. According to Transparency International, he owned 33 properties in Paris and Nice with a total value of more than £125 million. In contrast, U.S. authorities detected £86 million in his New York account. He gave exclusive rights to the French oil company Elf-Aquitaine, privileged to exploit Gabon's oil fields, in exchange for a security guarantee from France. He befriended successive French presidents, most notably Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac¹².

In 2007, O. Bongo bought properties in Paris for \$26 million. In the same year, he bought more properties for \$25 million. The properties were officially purchased by O. Bongo's two sons, Omar Denis and Yacine Queenie, who were aged 13 and 16 at the time. O. Bongo, who took power seven years after independence, used the national assets for his luxurious life throughout his reign. In contrast, Gabon, one of the richest countries in terms of natural resources, remained the poorest and most war-ravaged place on earth for the next four decades¹³.

The problem of corruption in Africa has been compared by some to advanced cancer. Corruption has brought the economies of many countries to ruin. The effects are very painful for the poorest. The involvement of large corporations in inducing corruption among gov-

¹¹ *Omar Bongo - Gabon's Ruler For Decades*, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200906150377.html>.

¹² *Omar Bongo*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/5478816/Omar-Bongo.html>.

¹³ *Omar Bongo - Gabon's Ruler For Decades*, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200906150377.html>.

ernment officials is high. However, detecting and presenting the scale and magnitude of such activities is difficult. Among the examples revealed, some events in this case can be revealed.

1. On September 17, 2002, a Canadian conglomerate called Acres International was accused in Lesotho of paying a \$260,000 bribe to sign an \$8 billion dam construction contract¹⁴.
2. One Swiss and one Italian conglomerate have been accused of paying bribes to the Somali Transitional Government to sign a deal to allow toxic waste to be diverted from their factories.
3. In 2002, a U.S. based conglomerate called Halliburton was accused of paying a \$180 million bribe to sign a \$10 billion gas contract.

Formal corruption in Africa is not legal, but it is visible more or less in every sphere of social life on the continent. Corruption exacerbates poverty, with the main victims being those from the poorest strata of society.

The results of a 2005 survey of 69 countries involving 55,000 people conducted by Gallup International show the widespread scale of corruption in Africa. When asked if any family member had given a bribe to someone in the past 12 months, between 11 and 30% of residents in Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Kenya and Senegal answered the question in the affirmative. In Cameroon, by contrast, the rate was 31-50%¹⁵.

In 2003, the amount of bribes given in Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria, according to the study, was 20% of GDP; in Kenya and Togo it was 10-20% of GDP. Among the most corrupt institutions were listed: the police - 4.4%, political parties - 4.2%, customs 4.0% and parliament 3.8%¹⁶.

According to African Union sources, corruption costs the African continent nearly \$150 billion a year. Corruption is an obstacle to democracy, in addition to depriving people of the right to enjoy the

¹⁴ *Graft in Africa: Where Does the Buck Stop?* <http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=4156>.

¹⁵ *Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer*, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2005/09_12_2005_barometer_2005.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

benefits that citizens enjoy on an equal basis. The cost of goods is 20% higher, which can be a direct cause of stagnant economic development. According to an estimate, the halting or wasted economy due to the actions of corruption amounts to as much as 25% of the African continent's GDP. A study by the *African Development Bank* states that due to corruption, the loss of income of countries in the form of tax reaches 50% of GDP, which is comparable to the total foreign debts of some African countries. According to the study, those with the lowest income spent an average of 2% of their income on bribes, while relatively wealthier residents on average spent 0.9% of their income for the same purpose¹⁷.

The activities of Swiss banks have been loudly criticized in Western countries themselves. The practice of these banks encourages corruption and laundering of money from Africa. Many developing countries have lost unimaginable sums. Africa is the most disadvantaged continent in this regard, lacking schools, hospitals, roads, electricity, clean water, communications, etc. In view of this, the huge amount of money stolen from the needy is an inexplicable act, let alone cooperation in securing the stolen money. It is estimated that 35% of the world's secret private accounts are in these banks¹⁸.

Every year, beginning in 2000, the richest countries allocate about \$100 billion for development purposes to poor countries, including about \$10 billion to Africa. In contrast, in various forms of corruption, from all developing countries, about \$900 billion goes to rich countries headed by Switzerland, of which \$150 billion of this sum comes from Africa¹⁹. This fact shows that Africa would do much better on its own if its leaders had "clean hands" and international control over money laundering was radically improved.

¹⁷ *Corruption Risk Analysis in Southern Africa*, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/nis_africa.

¹⁸ *Switzerland: A Parasite Feeding on Poor African and Third World Countries?*, <http://www.mathaba.net/news/?x=622596>.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

Military Spending

The priority of the defence sector is one of the causes of increasing poverty in Africa. Huge amounts of money are allocated for this purpose every year. In contrast, less attention is paid to social development goals. Such action burdens citizens and at the same time hinders the overall development of society.

Table 3. Military spending in billions of dollars (USD), by region in Africa from 1988 to 2004.

Year	Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	North Africa
1988	14,0	10,5	3,5
1989	14,3	10,7	3,6
1990	14,7	11,1	3,6
1991	13,1	9,4	3,7
1992	12,1	8,0	4,1
1993	14,3	9,9	4,3
1994	13,7	9,0	4,7
1995	12,8	8,3	4,5
1996	12,4	7,7	4,7
1997	13,0	7,8	5,2
1998	13,8	8,3	5,4
1999	19,1	14,0	5,1
2000	17,1	12,0	5,5
2001	17,6	11,1	6,5
2002	18,6	12,1	6,5
2003	18,5	11,7	6,8
2004	17,6	13,4	7,4

Source: *World and Regional Military Expenditure*, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/worldreg2010>.

Analyses done to date have not accurately shown the size of defence spending in Africa. This problem is due to various reasons²⁰:

1. Information on defence spending is deliberately concealed; where it is public, there is a great likelihood as to its unreliability.

²⁰ W. Omitoogun, *Military Expenditure Data in Africa: A Survey of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda*, Oxford University Press, Oxford - New York 2003, p. 4.

2. Some countries are unwilling to disclose the size of expenditures to hide from potential enemies.
3. Countries hide the real trends of increased military spending from their citizens in order to prevent possible protests.

Due to the above reasons, researchers in this field are unable to demonstrate real data. As a result, they mostly rely on official data disseminated by countries²¹.

In 2009 in Africa, military spending amounted to \$27.4 billion, which was 6.5% more than the previous year (2008). Above all, the upward trend in military spending is most noticeable in oil-producing countries like Angola, Chad and Nigeria.

Angola spent \$3.2 billion in 2009; an increase of 19% since 2008 and 40% since 2000. In Chad, military spending in 2009 was \$436 million. This figure was lower compared to 2008 but was actually six times higher than in 2005.

In 2009, Nigeria officially allocated \$1.5 billion to the military which was 4% more than in 2008. In contrast, the growth rate was 101% higher than in 2000²².

Many Africans have lost their lives to disease, war and famine. Others had to escape poverty by seeking a better life in other countries. In contrast, many of Africa's leaders cared only for themselves, bringing their own countries to ruin and condemning their citizens to poverty. In this way, they ruled over the country often for life. Development aid provided by richer countries has generally not worked. Africa is being plunged by its leaders. Huge, unnecessary spending, mainly to secure the leaders' survival in power, needs to be radically changed. Africa needs to put in place mechanisms to control public finances, respect the rule of law and punish corrupt government officials. Strengthening control systems at the national as well as the overall international level can lead to improvements.

²¹ W. Omitoogun, *Military Expenditure and Conflict in Africa...*, p. 2.

²² *SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford - New York 2010, pp. 189-191.

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Chapter 2

Religion and its Radicalisation in the Politics of African States

Introduction

The main aim of this chapter is to investigate relevant policy problems regarding religions and their impact on politics or vice versa, introduced by some members of religious movements and governments in Africa. The study is based on the main largest religions in Africa, Christianity, Islam and their followers. In the next few decades, the African Muslim population is expected to grow at a faster rate, and this fact will have a great consequence regarding the impact of Islam which may dominate politics in Africa. Religious organizations are also engaged in launching their struggle for the control of political power; one of the best examples could be the successful control of governance strategy by the Islamists in Sudan, which led to persecution and imposition of Islamic law on Christians and other believers. In many African countries, religions are used inappropriately for political purposes. The impact of religion is also used for manipulation. It also helps to adopt laws to fulfill the particular interests of the ruling class. Religious-based governments do not respect the sphere of privacy for individuals and collective religious freedom, while they support only their religious preferences. On the other hand, they persecute and repress others. There are some signs of reinforcement of secular trends and the establishment of laws guaranteeing the division of religion and

states in Africa. The main purpose of the linkage between religion and political power is intended to have full control over the citizens and to fight, repress, or eliminate political and religious opponents.

* * *

African communities are religiously diverse. The lack of rule of law, political, social and economic instability in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa generates favourable conditions for the expansion of religiously radical views. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the significant problems of religious politics, above all the influence of politics on religion or vice versa, which some states or religious movements are pursuing. This concerns the main religions in Africa: Christianity and Islam and the situation of their adherents. The analysis of this problem is an attempt to demonstrate the role and behaviour of political power, i.e. those in power, in establishing laws and freedoms that guarantee the distribution of power often dependent on religion and the question of state neutrality. This study also deals with, the problem of the instrumental use of religion by states as well as by religious organisations as a means of achieving a certain political goal, which may result in religious radicalism.

The analysis of this problem mainly focuses on selected countries most affected by ethnic or religious conflict or suffering from poor social cohesion in Africa. To explain these phenomena, selected problems in various African countries, including Sudan, Somalia and others, are analysed. The phenomenon will be examined in an internal context as well as internationally.

The Question of the Relationship Between State and Religion

The concept of the modern state system in Africa is linked to the struggle for independence. After independence, in the political context, these states are organised around two great religious traditions,

Islam and Christianity. In contrast, the idea of combining politics and religion and the secular nature of these states introduces new political elements into these religious traditions. Religion in Africa is part of the ongoing debates related to the state-wide question; Who should govern, and how should the state be governed? Several historical examples show that religion has taken a stand not only on issues of social problem-solving, but also on state governance, such as¹:

- The institution of apartheid in South Africa with the blessing of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa;
- Africanisation of the Christian Church leadership during the assumption of power by African nationalists replacing European colonial administration;
- The emergence of new problems, including crime and corruption associated with political systems in new countries and the search for support for religious institutions in terms of morality and ethics.

The liberal democracy and economic prosperity that African nationalists promised their citizens in the 1960s and 1970s have not been achieved. In the absence of respect for human dignity and the provision of an economic minimum to live on, together with a widening gap between rich and poor and increasing ethnic conflicts, the social contracts between the state and its citizens were broken. African religious leaders countered this phenomenon by proclaiming that religion should be a guidepost both in personal life and should be used to fulfill the duties of the state, which are measured by the action of the majesty of God, and it is the state that is the representative of this majesty.

African states, in their earlier positions, opposed the far-reaching interaction between the state and the two great religious traditions. Sometimes politicians persecuted religious leaders or dismantled their organisations, and in other cases, they showed concessions.

Examples include the relationship between President Gamal A. Nasser and the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt; Muammar Gaddafi and the Sanusiyya in Libya; Jafar Nimeiri and the

¹ *Religion and the State - Africa*, <http://science.jrank.org/pages/8043/Religion-State-Africa.html>.

National Islamic Front in Sudan. All of these politicians professed 'love and hate'.

Initially, there was a period of leniency in the relationship between state and religion in newly independent Africa, but in the 1980s, powerful Islamic and Christian movements arose and this was perceived as a threat to the very existence of the state. In such situations, confrontation between the state and religion became a reality.

South Africa was in a serious crisis because of the so-called state theology. As the result strong liberation movements of black theologians emerged. A strong ideological initiative countering apartheid ideology also emerged. They sought to convince religious communities (the South African Council of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches and, more importantly, the World Alliance of the Dutch Reformed Church) that apartheid was a form of 'sin structure'. Members of religious communities (both Christian and Muslim) played a huge role in mobilising and raising awareness of the injustice to the people of South Africa and to the international community, which eventually led to the collapse of the apartheid ideology².

Elsewhere in Africa, in terms of religious freedoms, religious leaders have also levelled criticism at African dictators, e.g., Idi Amin (Uganda), Hastings Banda (Malawi), Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia), Sani Abacha (Nigeria) and more recently Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe). On the other hand, African political leaders who were Christians were not afraid to proclaim the Christian faith in public; among others, we can mention, the Christian convert of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo and Félix Houphouët-Boigny as the Christian president of Côte d'Ivoire, who built one of the largest Roman Catholic churches (the basilica in Yamoussoukro) in 1989.

In some countries, Muslims, who recognise the state as a sacred entity under God, have called on secular state leaders to adhere to the Islamic order, opposing the creation of new secular organisations or political institutions. Despite such demands, various Islamic organisations have encountered problems. In Morocco, the Islamic group "Justice and Care" was disbanded in 1990, Algerian Salafists who want-

² Ibidem.

ed a return to the original Islamic ideals came under great pressure from the government. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was legalised in 1989 and won the elections of the same year, but the Algerian government cancelled the elections, most of the FIS leaders were arrested. And in 1992 the organisation was banned.

The Islamic Party in Kenya was denied official recognition during Daniel Moi's presidency. But in countries such as, Tanzania and Uganda, Islamic organisations were encouraged to form and gain government patronage³. And the Egyptian experience in the form of the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 by a member of the banned and radical Islamic organisation Talkir Wa-Hijra, was very instructive for many African politicians⁴.

Another example is the years of authoritarian rule by President Siad Barre and the lack of democratic governance, which undermined civil society formation in Somalia. In the early 1990s, Somalia descended into civil war and state disintegration ensued. This situation led to a race among a number of groups vying with each other for power and resources in the country. Many observers have noted that Somalis reacted to these vicious situations by gathering in mosques to seek solutions to the problem based on religion. This was the beginning of the gradual politicisation of Islam in Somalia. To varying degrees, both by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the Mujahideen Youth Movement (Al-Shabab) in the struggle to implement Islamic law aimed at bringing about political stability and this problem continues without solutions⁵.

The Relationship of Islam and Christianity to Democracy

Muslims around the world express broad support for democracy and for people of other faiths to be able to practice their religion freely. At

³ Ibidem.

⁴ R. Dreyfuss, *Why London's Muslim Brotherhood killed President Sadat*, "EIR" 1981, Vol. 8, No. 41, p. 19.

⁵ T. Østebø, *Islamic Militancy in Africa*, Africa Security Brief, A Publication of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2012, No. 23, p. 4.

the same time, many Muslims argue that religious leaders should have a say in political affairs and regard Islamic parties as good or better than other political parties. The vast majority of Muslims in most countries state that, through suicide bombings, they are never justified in defending Islam against its enemies. However, a significant minority in a few countries consider such violence justified, at least in certain circumstances⁶.

Concepts such as: “political Islam” or “Islamism”, imply that the religion of Islam functions as a political ideology, rather than a purely religious or theological one. Advocates of this view, first and foremost, see Islam as an overarching faith that has something important to say about politics. Consequently, in the modern Islamic world, societies should be subject to and implement Islam as a guiding principles.

Political scientist Guilain Denoëux, defines Islamism as “a form of tools for individuals, groups and organisations pursuing their political goals. Political Islam provides Islamists with powerful *tools of ideological* manipulation that they can use to direct the political, to challenge the social, to give direction to the future based on Islamic tradition”⁷.

Some influential observers conclude that Islam and democracy are disconnected. For example, Samuel Huntington argues that “the Qur’an rejects the distinction between religious and political authority, for which reason Islamic traditions find it difficult to coexist with democracy”⁸. Elie Kedourie also argues that “universal suffrage and a system of representation are deeply alien to the Muslim political tradition”⁹.

There are also opposing views that disagree with the above views. John Esposito and John Voll highlight the diverse spectrum of conservative and progressive trends in Islam, including new movements that seek to reconcile religious revivalism and democratisation. Abdou Filali-Ansary goes even further, arguing that democracy, usually described as Western values, originally originated in the Islamic East.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ M. Ayoob, *Political Islam: Image and Reality*, “World Policy Journal” 2004, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 1.

⁸ *Islam, Democracy, and Public Opinion in Africa*, Afrobarometer Briefing Paper, 2002, No. 3, p. 1.

⁹ Ibidem.

An opinion poll was conducted to verify this competing relationship between Islam and democracy. The results, conducted in Morocco, Egypt and Algeria, confirmed that “being Muslim does not lead to a rejection of democracy or support for dictatorship”¹⁰.

Similar research was also conducted by Afrobarometer, from mid-1999 to mid-2001. It aimed to extend this research to Sub-Saharan Africa. Religious identification and attitudes towards democracy were measured in four East and West African countries: in Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. The surveys were conducted on nationally representative samples of Muslims and non-Muslims, which correlated almost perfectly. In these four countries, the population surveyed was almost equally divided between Muslims (46%) and non-Muslims (54%), and thus allowed comparisons to be made between religious communities. The findings from Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East reinforce the knowledge of believers’ attitudes towards democracy. Although adherents of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa occasionally showed distinctive political attitudes towards democracy, they did not differ significantly from non-Muslims on this topic. Regardless of religious orientation, on average, more than seven out of ten people in the four African countries said they supported democracy. Some 71% of Muslims, and 76% of non-Muslims, agree that “democracy is preferable to other forms of government”. By contrast, in West Africa, Muslim minorities would tolerate a return to authoritarian rule, contrary to circulating views expressing support for democracy by Muslim majorities¹¹.

Comparing the Growth in Demographics of Followers of Christianity and Islam - Globally and in Africa

As of 2010, Christianity was by far the largest religion in the world, with an estimated 2.2 billion worldwide, almost a third (31%) of all 6.9 billion people on Earth. Islam was second, with 1.6 billion adherents,

¹⁰ M. Tessler, *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries*, “Comparative Politics” 2002, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 350.

¹¹ *Islam, Democracy, and Public Opinion in Africa*, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

representing 23% of the world's population. Even if current demographic trends continue, Islam will almost "catch up" with Christianity by the middle of the 21st century. Between 2010 and 2050, the total world population is expected to grow to 9.3 billion people, an increase of 35%. During this period, for the Muslim population with a relatively high birth rate - an increase of 73% is projected. The number of Christians is also projected to increase, but at a slower pace, at about the same rate (35%) as the global population average. As a result, according to predictions by the US social research institute Pew Research Center, there will almost be parity between Muslims (2.8 billion, or 30% of the population) and Christians (2.9 billion, or 31%) in 2050, which could probably happen for the first time in history.

Mainly due to strong population growth, Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to show the fastest rate of overall growth. This will increase from 12% of the world's population in 2010, to around 20% in 2050. The Middle East and North Africa region shows that the population is growing faster than the global total of the world's population. This represents an increase from 5% of the world's population in 2010 to 6% in 2050. Continued growth in both regions will drive global Muslim population growth¹². This also has a huge impact on changes in the political scene, thus confirming the importance of the growth of Muslims.

Some researchers state that the exact number of Muslims in Africa is not known due to the fact that statistics on religious demography in Africa are incomplete. Conducted by the *Western Journal of Black Studies* in 2005, which revealed the results of religious demography in Africa in the following table¹³.

Some scholars argue that Islam is both a local and a global phenomenon in terms of Africa as a continent. At the local level, experts argue that Muslims (including African Muslims) operate largely autonomously without the support of an international organisation that regu-

¹² P. Henne, *Latest Trends in Religious Restrictions and Hostilities, Overall Decline in Social Hostilities in 2013, Though Harassment of Jews Worldwide Reached a Seven-Year High*, <http://www.pewforum.org/2015/02/26/religious-hostilities/>.

¹³ F. Fonge, *Conceptualizing the Trajectories and Proselytization of Islam in Africa*, "International Journal of Humanities and Social Science" March 2015, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 30.

Table 1. Religions in Africa by region (number of adherents).

Africa region	Indigenous	Islam	Christianity	Other	Total
East Africa	52 14 073	59 091 873	135 194 880	6 058 251	252 459,077
Central Africa	21 001 056	13 528 373	61 821 241	437 688	96 788 358
North Africa	9 020 093	167 131 245	6 410 368	632 920	183 194 626
Southern Africa	14 089 672	871 722	34 202 095	1 087 807	50 251 296
West Africa	41 617 613	130 835 929	66,685,296	1,601,876	240,740,714
Total	137 842 507	371 459 142	304 313 880	9 818 542	823 434 071
in %	16.7%	45.1%	36.9%	1.2%	99.9%

Source: F. Fonge, *Conceptualizing the Trajectories and Proselytization of Islam in Africa*, "International Journal of Humanities and Social Science" March 2015, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 30.

lates their religious practices. This fact accounts for the differences and variations in Islamic practices across the African continent. On a global level, however, African Muslims belong to Islamic communities around the world, and then follow global issues and events that affect the Muslim world and are of great interest. With globalisation and the new initiative in information technology, African Muslims are developing close links with the entire Muslim world¹⁴.

Influence of Government (State) on Religions

The idea of mixing religion and politics is a potentially dangerous phenomenon from the point of view of secularism considered as one of the characteristics of modern democratic society. In formal political terms, secularism refers to the idea of a division between the institutions of the state and the Church, given the lack of integration or interdependence of religion with public affairs. The origins of secularism can be traced back to modern Europe and the establishment of the sovereign state. Aspects of the discourse of secularism, however, can be found throughout history and within the core texts of world religions such as Christianity and Islam. Contemporary secularism is linked to

¹⁴ H. D. Hassan, *Islam in Africa*, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC (May 9, 2008), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22873.pdf>.

important intellectual developments and the need for profound political and social reform in Europe, which developed under the influence of the Enlightenment and the birth of modern political sovereignty¹⁵.

The relationship between state policy and religion is of vital importance. Henry Kiereś writes that “this conflict occurs when politics, as represented by state institutions, does not countenance the seriousness of religious beliefs, the warp of social life, or when - for ad hoc tactical or programmatic reasons - it doctrinally identifies with religion and loses its autonomy”¹⁶. Normally, their mutual distance is balanced, when politics cannot disregard religion and religion dominates politics.

The enactment of laws by states regarding religion can be intrusive and open. Laws in which it is the state that proclaims open support for a particular religion, or a preference for tolerance towards some and an absolute ban on other religions. An example can be found in Mauritania’s constitution, which proclaims Islam not only as the state religion, but also says in order to claim the position of head of state, a citizen must necessarily be Muslim. Similarly, the preamble of Malawi’s constitution declares Christianity as the state religion, but with no explicit restriction on running for president as a Christian¹⁷.

Ugandan jurist Daniel Nsereko, distinguished three broad categories regarding the relationship between religion and the state in Africa as follows:

- Separation of Church and State;
- The superiority of religion over the state;
- State control over religion.

The approach to legislating on religion varies. Some constitutions of African countries prioritise these issues and establish them as a first category, while others establish them as secondary. Another phenomenon encountered is also where some specific individuals can be found using the influence of religion for political purposes. Among the coun-

¹⁵ P. Mandaville, *How do religious beliefs affect politics?* <http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/9780415431316/Sample%20Chapter%20205.pdf>.

¹⁶ H. Kiereś, *Politics and Religion. On the background of Feliks Koneczny’s thought*, “Człowiek w Kulturze” 2000, Vol. 13, p. 191.

¹⁷ K. Quashigah, *The need for a distanced relationship: Religion and the republican state in Africa*, “African Human Rights Law Journal” 2014, Vol. 1, p. 79.

tries where constitutions regulate the separation of church and state are Angola, Benin and Ethiopia. Angola's constitution explicitly addresses the above issue in Article 8 and states that:

- The Republic of Angola will be a secular state, and there is a division between the state and the churches.
- Religions are respected and the state should protect churches and places and objects of worship, subject to compliance with state legislation.

Similarly, Ethiopia's Constitution clearly states in Article 11 that:

- Ensures the separation of state and religion;
- Does not provide for a state religion;
- The state should not interfere in religious affairs and religion should not interfere in the affairs of the state.

Benin's constitution goes even further in the direction of secularism, prohibiting in Article 156, any amendment to it that would violate the republican form of government and the secularity of the state. Ghana's Constitution in Article 55(4) ensures that membership of a political party "shall not be based on ethnic, religious, regional or any other divisive criterion" and in Article 56 prohibits parliament from legislating to impose a common agenda or set of goals of a religious or political nature.

According to D. Nsereko, a practical and absolute separation of church and state is unattainable, especially in the conditions of African states, due to the realities of life, e.g. participation in various religious institutions is needed to fulfil and enhance educational, medical and other social goals. It should be emphasised that a secular state should not mean the total exclusion of these religions from the above-mentioned areas of social service¹⁸.

Religion and Human Rights

The right to religious freedom is a fundamental right for every citizen both physically and ideologically. In contrast, abuse, discrimina-

¹⁸ Ibidem, pp. 82-83.

tion and persecution occur even in states that have declared both the right to religious freedom in internal legislation and in international agreements. The law in modern states of the world does not impose a specific religion on all citizens for its instrumental use. In this regard, various international human rights agreements and modern constitutions of many African states have emerged guaranteeing the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion¹⁹. Namely, *The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, adopted at the Organisation of African Unity's conference in Nairobi on 26 June 1981 and in force since 21 October 1986, unequivocally imposes an obligation on member states to respect, inter alia, religious and political beliefs. In this charter, Article 2 states the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic group membership, colour, sex, language, religious, political or any other belief, national or social origin, birth or other status²⁰.

An analysis of the prohibition or restriction of religion shows the scale of the problem globally as well as in Africa. Religious restrictions take place to varying degrees. Government restrictions on religious freedom at the local level are based on a variety of actions, including through the use of coercion and force. The share of governments engaging in religious restriction of a high or very high degree remained roughly the same, from 2012 to 2013. The share of countries in this category was 27% in 2013, compared to 29% in 2012. Government imposition of restrictions on religions includes efforts to control religious groups and individuals in a number of different ways. These range from registration requirements to discriminatory policies and outright bans on certain faiths. Looking at the overall level of restrictions resulting from government policy or from hostile legislation by individuals, organisations and community groups - the research confirmed that restrictions on religions were high or very high in 39% of countries. As some of these countries e.g. (China and India) with high urban populations, some 5.5 billion people (77% of the world's population) lived in countries with high or very high overall levels of restrictions on religion in 2013, compared to 76% in 2012 and 68% in 2007.

¹⁹ K. Quashigah, op. cit., p. 80.

²⁰ *African (BANJUL) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986, Article 2.

Research shows that states take, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs and practices for a variety of reasons. These actions consist of a number of ways of restriction, including actions taken by the government to ban a particular faith, such as banning conversion to other religions, limiting the spread of religion, or favouring one or more religious groups, among others.

A centre for research on this phenomenon, the Pew Research Center has distinguished three measures used in terms of government restrictions and three on hostile social relations of target groups that tend towards religious minorities. In the case of government, these restrictions include bans on specific faiths; attempts to control or intimidate faiths through the use of force; and taking action to eliminate groups. In 2013, almost a third of the world's countries, 59 countries (30%) had at least one of these restrictions. There are instances in which, a state may restrict a particular minority group's activities, but at the same time respecting the religious rights of others living in the same country.

A new study by the Pew Research Institute finds that countries with restrictions or hostile actions are targeted primarily at religious minorities. Among the 59 countries with at least one of the government restrictions directed primarily at religious minorities. An index of 43 (73%) had a high or very high impact on the 2013 *Government Restriction Index* (GRI) score. In the rest of the world, 8% of countries had a high or very high score on the GRI. Some sources also state that all of the most restrictive countries, those with very high GRI scores, had at least one type of communal restriction that was directed primarily at religious minorities²¹.

The Shaping of the Role of Political Islam in Sudan and its Implications

The political scene in the modern Sudan began to take shape in the late 1930s and early 1940s, at a time when national sentiment towards

²¹ Ibidem.

the British-Egyptian reached its peak and the colonial power began to accept ideas of self-determination. The political parties that emerged during this period were an elite group, originally organised under the umbrella of the so-called Congress alumni movement. This historical experience, more than any other factor, influenced the way in which political parties organised and unified their structure. Such was the role played by the sectarian parties from the very beginning of their emergence on the political scene, which had the support of the main traditional sect leaders: Ansar and Khatmiyya. Hence, Islam has become an important factor in shaping daily interactions on the part of broad swathes of society across the country. The answer to some of the most puzzling problems in contemporary Sudan can be found by understanding the influence of Islam on the Sudanese political scene, whose Islamic roots date back to the 15th century²².

Over the past few decades, the Islamic movement in Sudan has taken on different names and developed different variations of organisational structures. The strategy behind these changes was based on the realisation that the Islamic movement did not represent the plethora of groups that support Islam as a guideline for daily life in the Sudanese community. These groups support Ansar al-Sunna, the Republican Brothers and other smaller Sufi heritage groups, as well as the leaders of the traditional chief priests of various sects. None of these groups were aligned with the political Islam they demanded, the Muslim Brothers from the beginning and neither accepted. It was a movement to achieve its goal of establishing an Islamic state in the country. The use of the term 'Islamic Movement' refers to those who organised themselves in a political party and who themselves demanded the adoption of the 'Islamisation' of the Sudanese state through all possible means.

The relationship between the world of the Islamic movement and other political parties has changed over time, ranging from alliances to direct opposition and confrontation. On the other hand, Islamists were willing to accept Islamic courts and Sharia law as the guiding principle

²² A. G. M. Ahmed, *One Against All: The National Islamic Front (NIF) and Sudanese Sectarian and Secular Parties*, Chr. Michelsen Institute, SWP Working Paper SWP, Bergen 2008, Vol. 6, p. 1.

in governing the country to shape the state and social relations. One of the most important developments in Islam that inspired religious practice among Sudanese Muslims was the prevalence of Sufism. Practiced by the Sudanese, one of the most important aspects of Sufism was its emphasis on ecstatic *experiences* and local rituals, which grew strongly from earlier traditional practices, and thus the transmission of religiosity from the master to his disciples, which is consistent with the traditional transmission of authority and oral transmission of knowledge²³.

At independence, families descended from Muhammad Ahmad bin Abd Allah (Mahdi) led both the National Umma Party and the Ansar brotherhood. The party and brotherhood were banned by the military coup of 25 May 1969, and were later forced into exile. Following this event, the socialist junta of Col. Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri promoted minority Sufi fraternities and murdered thousands of Umma Party supporters and Ansar members. However, they returned to power in the state after the removal of the dictator on 6 April 1985, and are still politically active today. The Islamic coup of 30 June 1989, was a significant start to the rise of the Muslim Brothers - Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi.

In the same vein, the use of Islam as the official law of the state was much more institutionalised in Sudan. In a concluded decree of 9 September 1983, Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri imposed Sharia principles for the first time throughout the country and even in the south, where Muslims were a minority and where this decision contributed to the Second Civil War under the aegis of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

After the overthrow of the dictatorship, the National Islamic Front rejected the approval of the peace agreement signed on 16 November 1988, precisely because the government was about to adopt abrogating Islamic law to satisfy the demands of the people of the southern part of Sudan²⁴.

Despite informal acceptance by parliament to suspend Sharia law on 3 April 1989, through a military coup led by General Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, negotiations were interrupted and the constitu-

²³ Ibidem.

²⁴ M. A. Pérouse de Montclos, *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, West African Politics and Society Series, 2014, Vol. 2, p. 154.

tion was abrogated, also abolishing political parties, banning trade unions and closing newspapers. A state of emergency was declared on 5 February 1991, and Islam was reinstated as the only official religion in Sudan by decree. Adopted by 96% of voters for the religion of Islam in a referendum held on 30 June 1998, the new constitution was extremely restrictive in this regard, as its Articles 7 and 10, state that jihad, defence of the country and payment of zakat are obligations for all citizens of the state, including non-Muslims²⁵.

The dictatorship and civil war in Sudan, which became a feature of the country after independence, demonstrated the classic approach of authoritarianism based on a religious majority. In this state, the northern Muslim elites in particular consistently maintained that the Muslim majority had the democratic right to establish a Muslim-inspired and regulated state based on *legal norms* with *religious norms*²⁶.

Since the beginning of the days of independence, and especially since the Islamists assumed power in 1989, the systematic Islamic dominance of the norm has found its way into a wide range of constitutional and legal provisions, as well as applied political practice, in order to consolidate Islam in Sudan. Such persistent attempts to enforce Islamic identity throughout the country had negative consequences, mainly in the southern religious minority which triggered numerous rebellions and secessionist tendencies²⁷.

An Umma party leader at the eleventh annual conference of the Sudanese Philosophical Societies (1965) stated that “the dominant feature of our Islamic nation and its symbolism is that of belonging as an Arab, and this nation will have the identity of an individual identifying its prestige and pride which are based in the power of Islamic revival”²⁸. Religion plays a central role in issues of belonging. It can be argued that religion defines and enables the location of an individual’s

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 155.

²⁶ A. T. El-Gaili, *Federalism and the Tyranny of Religious Majorities: Challenges to Islamic Federalism in Sudan*, “Harvard International Journal” 2004, Vol. 45, No. 2, p. 503.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ V. Richard, *Is the Sudan conflict best understood in terms of race, religion, or regionalism?*, <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/05/22/is-the-sudan-conflict-best-understood-in-terms-of-race-religion-or-regionalism/>.

place in society in terms of, rituals, customs, dialogue and even hierarchy in a set order²⁹.

Conclusion

In the coming decades, the demographic growth of primarily Islamic adherents increases the influence of Islam on politics in Africa. From the very beginning, religious organisations have been involved in the struggle to assume power, e.g. through the successful adoption and governance of the state by Islamists in Sudan, leading to the persecution and imposition of Islamic laws on Christians and other believers. In many African states, religions are used inappropriately mainly for political purposes. The influence of religion is also used to manipulate in order to establish laws that enable the pursuit and thus fulfilment of the vested interests of those in power. Rulers have never respected the privacy spheres of individual as well as collective religious freedoms. Instead, they have favoured and supported only aspirations that favour their religious interests, and persecuted and repressed other religious believers. On the other hand, there is the phenomenon of the strengthening of secular tendencies and the establishment of laws guaranteeing the separation of religion and state, which cannot be ignored. The instrumental use and combination of religion and political power only serves to take full control of the rulers over the citizens. And, on the other hand, this fact has been used as an instrument of struggle, repression of opponents against political opponents and, ultimately, as a factor for eliminating competing religions.

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²⁹ Ibidem.

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Chapter 3

Political Leadership and Conflict of Power in Africa

Introduction

Political leadership during the period of independence movements in Africa was a prerequisite for leading the struggle against colonialism and possibly bringing about independence in the process of decolonisation. Colonialism, nationalism and the struggle for independence became a unifying force between different ethnic groups in different African countries. The leaders of the independence movements had the full acceptance of their people. This shared vision yielded the expected results. Africa gradually regained full independence. After independence, unfortunately, most of Africa's leaders radically departed from the promises and oaths they had made to their people; ultimately, the way they exercised power proved to be the source of all the political, economic and social problems of the current generation.

Many of Africa's early leaders remained in power for life; some were overthrown briefly or after reigning for many years. Military coups and guerrilla warfare became a means of changing power in most African countries. This had a negative impact on the development of the African continent. It also led to unprecedented corruption of the ruling class and other social problems: poverty, ethnic conflicts, refugees, etc.

Period of Struggle for Independence

During the period of the struggle for independence, charismatic leaders gained great popularity. A great hope for the future of the continent was associated with such leaders. Among the many charismatic leaders, one can mention Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria¹.

Kwame Nkrumah - was born on 21 September 1902. He studied in the United States and the United Kingdom from 1935. He returned to the country in 1947, after which he became chairman of the Gold Coast United Convention Party. Two years later he founded his own Gold Coast Convention Party. He was the leader of a series of strikes that had the character of a struggle for independence, during which he called for disobedience and a boycott of cooperation with the colonisers. Leading the country to independence, he became Prime Minister of independent Ghana on 6 March 1957. He played a very important role in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity. Despite his great contribution to the independence movement, he was accused of nepotism, introducing one-party rule, he was also army commander and did not tolerate opposition; he was overthrown in a military coup during a visit to China in 1966. He spent his life in exile in Guinea. At the age of 62, he died in Romania while undergoing medical treatment².

Nnamdi Azikwe - Benjamin Nnamdi Azikwe, born in 1904, was the first leader and founder of Nigerian nationalism. He became the first President of Nigeria in 1963. Azikwe was overthrown on 15 January 1966, in a military coup. He devoted most of his youth to politics and was admired and called a great African leader. His motto in politics was: "speak and I will listen to you, hear me speak". The direction and philosophy of his thinking were linked to African independence³. His

¹ Y. Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*, New York 1987, p. 164.

² H. Adi, M. Sherwood, *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and Diaspora since 1787*, New York 2003, p. 143.

³ *Encyclopedia of the Developing World*, ed. by T. M. Leonard, New York 2006, p. 128.

thoughts included a theory of the five most important factors that would lead to independence⁴:

1. Spiritual balance.
2. Social regeneration.
3. Economic self-sufficiency (economic determination).
4. Mental emancipation.
5. Political activism (political resurgence).

During the period of the independence movements, other leadership styles besides charismatic leadership were also exercised in Africa. Ali Mazuri lists the following types of leadership specific to the period of the independence movements as well as the later years⁵:

- a) charismatic leader
- b) mobilization leader
- c) reconciliation leader
- d) housekeeping style of political power - more governing and less leadership
- e) disciplinarian leader
- f) patriarchal leader
- g) technocratic leader
- h) personal leadership (personalistic political style)
- j) pre-colonial traditional style of leadership
- k) monarch (monarchy)

The aforementioned types of leadership took place in different countries in different eras. In contrast, the idea of Pan-Africanism and other concepts that emerged during the period of independence cannot be overlooked.

⁴ *President Nnamidi Azikwe*, http://www.gaboniworld.com/wiki-Nnamdi_Azikiwe.

⁵ A. Mazuri, *Pan-Africanism, Democracy and Leadership in Africa: The Continuing Legacy for the New Millennium*, http://igcs.binghamton.edu/igcs_site/dirton6.html.

The Dispute Over Africa's Future

The years after the Second World War until the 1960s can be described as the wave of African independence. It is an era in which nationalists as well as pan-Africanists fought in unison against the colonialists. Independence fighters as well as the diaspora rejected ethnic politics by standing with a wall in favour of unity and a common vision for Africans and Africa.

Pan-Africanists nourished the belief that the borders artificially established between African countries were temporary and would disappear in a short time. They dreamt of a rapid unification of the continent. However, views on the methods of unifying the continent already differed.

One of Africa's leading leaders, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, was among those who had a vision of a united and free Africa⁶. From the beginning of African independence, Kwame Nkrumah demanded and urged African leaders to work together towards a united Africa. As a charismatic leader, he preached the conviction of the need for unity politically as well as economically. His concept centered on the idea of Pan-Africanism, against nationalism and regionalism⁷. Kwame Nkrumah also put forward the concept of collective security, which was to be part of the concept of a united African government. The African armed forces that would be created were to be jointly commanded, and divided into different divisions: land forces, air force, navy, etc. Ghana during his time recruited young officers who were ready to serve in regional divisions in Africa⁸.

Julius Nyerere, on the other hand, was in favour of a federation of East African countries. He affirmed this in his 1960 speech in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa: "Many of us will agree with the idea of an East African federation, which is a legitimate goal. In fighting im-

⁶ A. B. Zack-Williams, *Africa Beyond the Post-Colonial: Political and Socio-Cultural Identities*, Aldershot 2004, p. 78.

⁷ *Regional International and Cooperation West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective*, ed. by R. Lavergene, Ottawa 1997, pp. 103-104.

⁸ *International Security Management and the United Nations*, ed. by M. Alagappa, T. Inoguchi, Tokyo - New York 1999, p. 295.

perialism, we must be aware that unity is strength. We must oppose the principles of <divide and rule>. We understand very well that the borders between our countries are drawn by the colonialists, not by us. We will not let this be an obstacle to our unity. Being divided, we will be weaker and we will never preserve our independence, we need deeds, not declarations(...)”⁹. Nyrere wanted, therefore, a far-reaching unification of the East African countries.

Despite the will and attempts at unification made by some African leaders, power rivalry between political leaders caused the idea of integration to be aborted¹⁰. The debate about the future of post-independence Africa for most African countries took place between different groups of states and involved different visions of African integration¹¹.

Casablanca Group - these are radical supporters of Pan-Africanism. They favour strong integration of independent African countries. This group consists of seven countries¹²:

1. Ghana
2. Egypt
3. Guinea
4. Morocco
5. Algeria
6. Mali
7. Libya

Mali and Libya only briefly joined the group.

The Monrovia Group - consisting of the leaders of the following 20 countries who met in Monrovia on 8 May 1961 are:

1. Congo
2. Côte d’Ivoire
3. Senegal
4. Mauritania

⁹ O. Uduku, A. B. Zack-Williams, *Africa Beyond the Post-Colonial Political and Socio-Cultural Identities*, Hampshire 2004, p. 78.

¹⁰ A. B. Zack-Williams, op. cit., p. 107.

¹¹ R. Lavergene, op. cit., p. 104.

¹² E. J. Osmańczyk, A. Mango, *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements*, New York 2003, p. 29.

5. Upper Volta
6. Niger
7. Benin
8. Chad
9. Gabon
10. Central African Republic
11. Cameroon
12. Madagascar
13. Liberia
14. Nigeria
15. Somalia
16. Sierra Leone
17. Togo
18. Ethiopia
19. Tunisia (as observer)
20. Libya (as observer)

The group rejected the notion of Pan-Africanism proposed by Kwame Nkrumah.

Brazzaville Group - The first meeting of the Brazzaville Group was held in the Congolese capital from 15-18 December 1960. This meeting was attended by 12 leaders of the following countries¹³:

1. Chad
2. Dahomey
3. Gabon
4. Upper Volta
5. Cameroon
6. Republic of Congo
7. Mauritania
8. Niger
9. Madagascar
10. Senegal
11. Côte d'Ivoire
12. Central African Republic.

¹³ Ibidem.

The aforementioned countries are former French colony countries. During a series of meetings in Brazzaville, the leaders discussed cooperation in economic and foreign policy areas while maintaining a special relationship with France. Eventually, all three groups developed a common position and contributed to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963¹⁴.

Consolidation of Post-colonial Power

African states in the first decades of independence concentrated on building a political system within the boundaries set by the colonial states. At that time, no attention was paid to the problem of ethnic composition, linguistic or religious differences, problems which Africa still faces today.

Africa's leaders began to consolidate control of national assets for their own benefit as well as that of the ruling team. The apparatus of state power was expanded at the will of those in power to serve their purposes. This soon led to a deepening economic and political crisis.

The history of post-colonial leadership in Africa, is a history of the assumption of power through violence. The change of power in many countries will occur on the basis of government overthrow, military coup, civil war, guerrilla warfare, etc.¹⁵. Peaceful transfers of power have been rare. Promises of freedom and prosperity for citizens proved unrealistic. The first leaders who led their citizens to independence, as well as their successors, often turned out to be dictators planning life-long leadership. Many of them have been overthrown, but some stayed in power.

The first post-colonial leaders, the period of their reign and how they left power in each country are as follows¹⁶:

¹⁴ *Brazzaville Group*, <http://encyklopedia.interia.pl/haslo?hid=121365>.

¹⁵ J. F. Kolie, *Why Most African Leaders like Taylor Failed*, <http://www.theperspective.org/2004/janwhytailorfailed.htm>.

¹⁶ *First African Rulers*, <http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/0africa.htm>.

- Algeria: President Ahmed Ben Bella, 1962-1965; coup.
- Angola: Agostinho Neto, 1975-1979; death.
- Benin: President Hubert Maga, 1960-1963; coup.
- Botswana: Sir Seretse Khama, 1966-1980; death.
- Burkina Faso: President Maurice Yaméogo, 1960-1966; coup.
- Burundi: King Mwambutsa IV, 1962-1966; forced to resign. Prime Minister André Muhirwa, 1962-1963; voluntary resignation.
- Cameroon: President Ahmadou Ahidjo, 1960-1982; voluntary resignation.
- Cape Verde: President Aristides Pereira, 1975-1991; free elections.
- Central African Republic: President David Dacko, 1960-1966; coup.
- Chad: François Tombalbaye, 1960-1975; coup.
- Comoros: President Ahmed Abdallah, 1975; forced to resign.
- Congo: President Fulbert Youlou, 1960-1963; forced to resign.
- Democratic Republic of Congo: President Joseph Kasavubu, 1960-1965; coup. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, 1960; forced to resign.
- Ivory Coast: Félix Houphouët-Boigny; president; 1960-1993; death.
- Djibouti: President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, 1977-1999; voluntary resignation.
- Equatorial Guinea: President Francisco Macías Nguema, 1968-1979; coup.
- Eritrea: President Issayas Afeworki, since 1993; still in power.
- Ethiopia: Emperor Haile Selassie I, 1930-1974; subversion.
- Gabon: President Léon M'Ba, 1960-1967; death.
- Gambia: President Sir Dawda Kairab Jawara, 1965-1994; coup.
- Ghana: President Kwame Nkrumah, 1957-1966; coup.
- Guinea: President Ahmed Sékou Touré, 1958-1984; death.
- Guinea-Bissau: Luís Cabral, 1974-1980; upheaval.
- Kenya: President Jomo Kenyatta, 1964-1978; death.
- Lesotho: King Moshoeshoe II; king, 1966-1990; forced to resign. Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan; prime minister; 1966-1986; coup.
- Liberia: President William Tubman; president; 1944-1971; death.
- Libya: King Idris I as-Sanusi, 1951-1969; coup.

- Madagascar: President Philibert Tsiranana, 1960-1972; forced to resign.
- Malawi: President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, 1964-1994; free elections.
- Mali: President Modibo Keita, 1960-1968; coup.
- Mauritania: President Moktar Ould Daddah, 1960-1978; coup.
- Mauritius: Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, 1968-1982; free elections.
- Morocco: King Muhammad V, (Sultan 1955-57); 1956-1961; death.
- Mozambique: President Samora Machel, 1975-1986; death.
- Namibia: President Sam Nujoma from 1990-2005; free elections.
- Niger: President Hamani Diori, 1960-1974; coup.
- Nigeria: President Nmandi Azikiwe, 1960-1966; coup.
Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa, 1960-1966; coup.
- Rwanda: President Grégoire Kayibanda, 1962-1973; coup.
- Sao Tome and Principe: President Manuel Pinto da Costa; 1975-1991; free elections.
- Senegal: President Léopold Sédar Senghor, 1960-1980; voluntary resignation.
- Seychelles: President Sir James Macham, 1976-1977; forced to resign.
- Sierra Leone: Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai, 1961-1964; death.
- Somalia: President Abdullah Osman Daar, 1960-1967; free election.
- Sudan: Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari since 1956; forced to resign
- Swaziland: King Sobhuza II, 1968-1982; death.
- Tanzania: President Julius Nyerere, 1964-1985; voluntary resignation.
- Togo: President Sylvanus Olympio, 1960-1963; coup.
- Tunisia: President Habib Bourguiba, 1956-1987; forced to resign.
- Uganda: President Sir Edward Mutesa, 1963-1966; forced to resign.
Prime Minister Milton Obote, 1963-1971; coup.
- Zambia: President Kenneth Kaunda, 1964-1991; free elections.
- Zimbabwe: President Robert Mugabe since 1980; resigned on November 21, 2017.

A Strategy of Centralising Authority

In most African countries, the determination to continue the unity of the nation, as was the case even before independence, became the motive for the spread of the one-party system. This in turn led to centralisation and concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals in the state. The evolution of this situation gave birth to the dictatorial (authoritarian) system. The public was excluded from making the most important decisions affecting it directly.

On the other hand, the authorities did everything to subjugate not only the political structures but also the system of economic functioning. Every protest - group or individual - was met with a harsh response. Arrests, harassment, torture, killing, and systematic human rights violations became a tool to get rid of opponents and prolong staying in power. In a milder version, traditional leaders were minimally allowed to participate in the decision-making process in some countries, but this behaviour also served to reinforce the one-party system¹⁷. Corruption developed on an unprecedented scale. According to Transparency, the value of capital exported from Africa by Africans is estimated at \$700-800 billion. This is more than the aid given to Africa after independence. The majority of this amount was likely to come from revenue generated from the sale of oil, timber, diamonds and other natural resources¹⁸.

The exacerbation of social problems under authoritarian rule has repeatedly led to civil wars resulting in the loss of life and property of hundreds of thousands of people, internal or internal migration.

The one-party system did not tolerate competing parties. Their development was controlled and quickly dismantled. If their existence is tolerated in some countries, they do not play a significant role in the political scene. Trade unions and organisations of a social nature are also under the strict control of those in power. The legal system and

¹⁷ K. Wiredu, W. E. Abraham, I. Menkiti, *A Companion to African Philosophy*, Oxford 2004, p. 505.

¹⁸ A. Lake, C. Tod, *More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa*, New York 2006, p. 107.

the judiciary are structured according to the will of the ruling parties and their leaders, for the survival of power¹⁹. Restrictions on civil rights, such as the prohibition of organised protests and the granting of excessive powers to security forces to combat such phenomena, are common in many African countries.

The trend towards concentration of government also means a shift of local authorities to central government, which limits the development of local communities.

The strategy of centralisation and concentration of power in Africa can be summarised as follows²⁰:

- a) legitimisation of the one-party system and prohibition or restriction of the multi-party system,
- b) prohibition of traditional as well as contemporary local institutions,
- c) systematic monitoring of the media, the judiciary and community organisations,
- d) recognition of the central authority headed by a leader as the sole source of power in the state.

The result of this strategy has been the unrest and ongoing social conflicts that have played out in contemporary Africa since independence.

Army and Leadership

The role of the army in governance in relation to civilian governance differs little. The ways of governing are similar. Civilian governments without the military have not been able to stay in power.

During the period of the struggle for African independence, patriots as well as nationalists distrusted the military because in some countries it was organised under colonial rule. Nationalists regarded the military as collaborating agents who suppressed insurgents and

¹⁹ E. Contech-Morgan, *Democratization in Africa: The Theory and Dynamic of Political Transitions*, Westport 1997, p. 56.

²⁰ Ibidem.

guarded colonialist interests. Therefore, leaders during the period of independence preferred exiled commanders to those who cooperated until independence. After independence, the military was recognised as a national army in some countries. An important step at this time was to change the mentality of the army towards assimilating nationalism and patriotism as important values. While the army began to regain the trust of the citizens, power-hungry politicians were preparing to take over. Corruption soon took hold. Nepotism became the norm. With this, leaders began to excel in wealth and citizens became poorer and poorer. There was a great public backlash against authority. The military, having the support of the public in the fight against corrupt power, joined social movements. A wave of military coups began. At first, this took place in Ghana, and then in Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and other countries.

The military, this time was seen as an alternative to authoritarian rule. It became the embodiment of patriotism, fighting against corrupt leaders. The military coup was thus justified and initially received positive public acceptance.

History has shown, however, that the military, justifying its quest for power on the grounds of the interest of the general public, has failed in its mission. It has proved to be as or more corrupt, repressive and incompetent in the exercise of power as the civilian governments it itself overthrew. The period between 1960 and 1970 is recognised as the decade of military coups in Africa. Their wave swept across Africa; the following summary illustrates the enormity of this phenomenon²¹:

1. Congo Kinshasa - in 1960, General Joseph Mobutu overthrew President Joseph Kasavubu²²;
2. Togo - on 13 January 1963 President Sylvanus Olimpio was overthrown and assassinated²³;
3. Congo - Brazzaville - in August 1963, the Abeb Youlou government was overthrown;

²¹ *Military Coupe in Africa*, [http://www.global security.org/military/library/report/1985](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985).

²² *1960: Violence Follows Army Coup in Congo*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/September/14/newsid_4578000/457725.htm.

²³ *Lome History*, http://www.africatravelling.net/togo/lome/lome_history.html.

4. Dahomey - President Maga was overthrown (the army commander was Christopher Sogolo);
5. Gabon - in February 1964, an attempt to overthrow the government was aborted by the intervention of French troops, who restored the previous government;
6. Algeria - in June 1965, the military overthrew President Ben Bell;
7. Dahomey - in December 1965, General Nicephore staged another military coup;
8. Burundi - in November 1965, the king was overthrown by officers of the country's army;
9. Central African Republic - in January 1966, Jean Bokassa overthrew President David Dacko;
10. Upper Volta - in January 1966, Songoule Lamizana overthrew President Maurice Yame;
11. Nigeria - in January 1966, Aguyi Ironii seizes power after staging a military coup;
12. Ghana - on 24 February 1966, President Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown by General Joseph A. Ankrah;
13. Nigeria - in July 1966, General Yakubu Golon overthrew General Aguya Ironii;
14. Burundi - in November 1966, Michel Mikembero took power after a military coup;
15. Sierra Leone - in March 1967, President Margai was overthrown by Colonel Yukon-Smith;
16. Algeria - another military coup took place in December 1967;
17. Sierra Leone - in April 1968, Colonel Yukon-Smith was overthrown by army officers and President Siaka Stevens took over (civilian authority was restored);
18. Mali - in November 1968, Colonel Mousa Traore overthrew President Modibo Keita;
19. Sudan - in May 1969, the so-called Free Officers Movement seized power;
20. Libya - in September 1969, the king was deposed;
21. Somalia - in November 1969, a military-led Revolutionary Council seized power by overthrowing the government.

The 1970s did not bring much change - in Uganda, President Mitou Obote was overthrown by General Idi Amin in January 1971, while in 1974 the military staged a coup in Ethiopia, overthrowing Emperor Haile Selassie. By 1975, almost half of African countries were under military rule.

There are many factors leading to such radical solutions as military coups. One of them is undoubtedly the crisis of political leadership, as well as the economic crisis, the internal problems of the ruling elites, the inability to resolve social conflicts. The most difficult problem, however, seems to be the diversity of ethnic groups and the divergence of their interests²⁴.

Conclusion

Political leadership during the period of freedom movement in Africa had a dominant role. They coordinated and led the independence struggle against colonialism. The case of independence became the common goal of all Africans. Political leaders had the full support of their people, among well-known charismatic leaders Kwame Nkrumah can be mentioned. After the gradual success of a common vision, which was independence, the view of previous freedom leaders was diversified in the process of the continent's unity; they were divided into three different groups. The Casablanca group favored a strong political union of independent Africa; the Monrovia group supported functional non-political cooperation and the Brazzaville group which stood for a gradual concept of African unity starting with regional cooperation. Eventually, all the leaders of the three groups agreed to form the Organization of African Unity.

Most of the freedom leaders started to build their power, based on a single-party system, planning to stay in power for lifelong. These leaders became dictators and corrupted. The transfer of state power was based on violence. Others died naturally exercising power while most

²⁴ *Military Coupe in Africa*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org.military/report/1985/WJ.html>.

of them were overthrown by military coupe or forced to leave office. They failed in terms of nation-building. Conflict over power-sharing started at the early stage of independence and still continues. The legacy of the wrong exercise of power has resulted in ethnic conflict, and political, economic and social crises in Africa.

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Chapter 4

Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: An Attempt of Explanation

Introduction

This chapter examines the historical relations of the states and the root causes of conflicts in the contemporary Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. It is one of the most affected regions by conflict. During the last decades, this region has been engulfed in spiraling conflict, which caused widespread famine, disease, displacement and a great loss of life. The infrastructure and the economy of the region were also badly damaged.

The Concept of the “Horn of Africa”

The term “Horn of Africa” is a contemporary term that originated during the period of African decolonisation. It is used to refer to the region of the eastern part of Africa, although its geopolitical extent is defined differently. According to some scholars, it includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. The area sometimes also referred to as the “little” Horn of Africa. Others add Kenya and Uganda to this region, referring to the whole as the ‘big’ Horn¹. The region has

¹ J. Mantel-Niećko, *Wstęp*, in: *Róg Afryki. Historia i współczesność*, ed. by J. Mantel-Niećko, M. Ząbek, Warsaw 1999, p. 15; *Great Horn of Africa*, USGS International

always been of important strategic importance, primarily because of its geographical location. Control over the area connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean also means strategic military and economic control over intercontinental routes. Therefore, regardless of the era, the Horn of Africa has been of interest to the powers of the world - from antiquity to the present day. The struggle for influence and control over the region was particularly intense during the colonial period and later, during the Cold War.

The formation of the independent states of the Horn of Africa has been and continues to be a very turbulent process. The modern political division of the region can be traced back to two important periods in the history of not only Africa, but the world as a whole. The first was the period of decolonisation that took place in the 1950s and 1960s. The second important moment was the fall of communism, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As it seems, the process of shaping the political division of the Horn of Africa is by no means over; it is accompanied by many complex conflicts, social problems and dramas of innocent people.

The process of the emergence of new state identities has come at an enormous cost. The causes of the political and armed conflicts in the “small” Horn of Africa, their course and consequences are the focus of this chapter.

Origins of Contemporary Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

Contemporary conflicts in the Horn of Africa have a very complex background. Their root causes lie in the history of the region (colonialism and decolonisation), ethnic and religious diversity, and interference by world powers (above all during the Cold War). Of course, in each of the countries of the region, the reasons for political and armed conflicts are different, nevertheless, the common denominator is certainly history.

Program, <http://edcintl.cr.usgs.gov/gha/gha.htm>; *Africa South of the Sahara*, <http://www.sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa.horn.html>.

The period of colonialism

In the 19th century, Northeast Africa was divided between Britain, France and Italy. The only country that did not submit to colonisation was Ethiopia.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened the trade route from Europe to India. The increase in economic turnover and strategic importance concerned not only the sea route connecting the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, but also the countries bordering the trade routes². They became a “glutton” for the European powers of the time.

In 1898, Britain occupied Sudanese territory. In 1899, Egypt and Britain signed a treaty to establish a joint Egyptian-English administration in Sudan. The British-Egyptian condominium lasted until 1951, when Egypt terminated the agreement, intending to bring Sudan under the Egyptian crown. Britain did not agree to this and in 1953 an Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed to recognise Sudan’s right to self-determination. In 1956 the independence of Sudan was proclaimed³.

The east coast of Somalia had been under Italian control since 1889. The Italians also leased land south of the British East African Campaign. All these leased areas and lands previously occupied were recognised by the Italian government as its colony in 1905⁴. Britain in turn occupied the districts of Zeila and Berbera in northern Somalia (1884), creating British Somalia. The Italians captured British Somali in 1940, but after Italy’s defeat against a combined Franco-British and Ethiopian force in 1941, the former Italian protectorate and the Ethiopian Somali-inhabited territories (Ogaden and Haud) came under British military administration. Italian Somali remained un-

² D. Hartlieb-Wroczyńska, *Kolonializm w Rogu Afryk*, in: *Róg Afryki...*, p. 95.

³ *Anglo-Egyptian Condominium*, *Britannica Online*, <http://www.britannica.com/eb/africle?tocId=9007586%query=condominium>; *The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium*, 1899-1955, <http://countrystudies.us/sudan/15.htm>.

⁴ *Somalia*, *The Columbia Encyclopedia*, 6th Edition, 2001, <http://www.bartleby.com/65/50/somalia.html>; *Somalia*, *infoplease*, <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0845894.htm>.

der British administration until 1950. In 1960, British and Italian Somali were merged to form the independent Republic of Somalia⁵.

France, on the other hand, purchased the territories around the Gulf of Tadjoura in 1884 and announced the takeover of the Sultanate of Tadjoura and the creation of a French colony called French Somali with its capital in the city of Djibouti. In 1967, the name was changed from French Somali to French Territory of the Afars and the Issas, and 10 years later the independence of the Republic of Djibouti was proclaimed⁶.

In turn, in 1890, the Italians proclaimed the creation of the Italian colony of Eritrea on the Red Sea coast. The defeat of Italian troops in 1941 brought Eritrea under British administration, which took place until 1952. At that time, a UN resolution was promulgated whereby Eritrea was incorporated into Ethiopia as an autonomous province with its own government and parliament. In 1962 Eritrea was annexed to Ethiopia as its 14th province and in 1993 proclaimed independence⁷.

* * *

The borders of African states, which are the result of colonial divisions, often become a hotbed of contemporary border conflicts after a period of decolonisation and independence. This was the case, for example, between 1977 and 1978, when war broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden, a region of Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis.

Another major border war broke out in 1998 between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The fighting intensified significantly in May 2000, despite several declarations by both sides of the conflict of their willingness to make peace. As a result of the conflict, 750,000 people had to leave their homes.

⁵ *Ogaden History Profile*, <http://www.ogaden.fi/info.html>; Somalia: Timeline ABC News.com, http://www.abc.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/Somalia_timeline.html.

⁶ *The Country and the People of Djibouti*, <http://www.hejleh.com/countries/djibouti.html>; Background Note: Djibouti, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5482htm>.

⁷ *Eritrea*, Yahoo!ingans! Reference: Columbia Encyclopedia, <http://yahoo.com/reference/encyclopedia/entry?id=15777>.

The border problem exists to a greater or lesser extent between all the countries in the Horn of Africa and represents a potential threat of further conflicts. The interference of European states during the colonial period in the natural divisions of communities in the Horn of Africa is still a source of instability in the region.

The Cold War

After decolonisation, until 1989/1990, two superpowers fought for influence in the Horn of Africa: the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War period determined the political, economic, and social as well as internal situation of the countries of the Horn of Africa, making them dependent on one superpower or the other. Also, the end of the Cold War had a huge impact on the region. The collapse of communism created a new situation in the Horn of Africa. A new state, Eritrea, was created. Dictatorial governments in Ethiopia and Somalia were overthrown. New power structures began to emerge in the still fledgling process of democratisation of political life. This process was taking place under very difficult conditions and often disrupted by ethnic conflicts, among other reasons.

Ethnic Diversity

One of the biggest problems facing the countries of the Horn of Africa is their multi-ethnicity. Ethnic diversity was and still a natural source of conflict, but it has been used to exert control and subjugate a state to its ends as far back as the colonial period. Supporting (financially, and materially) the domination of one ethnic group by the states concerned was a simple mechanism to control their own *status quo*. In the Horn of Africa, the problem of enormous ethnic diversity could be the main source of conflict, for example in Ethiopia more than 80 ethnic

groups. To mention only the major ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa which include⁸:

- Ethiopia: Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, Somali, Sidama, Hadiya, Gurage, and others.
- Somalia: Somali (majority), Bantu, Arabs, Persians, and minorities like Bajuni.
- Eritrea: Tigrinya, Tigre, Saho, Bilen, Rashaida, and others.
- Djibouti: Somali (majority), Afar, Arabs, Ethiopians, and French expatriates.
- Sudan: Arab Sudanese, Nilotic groups (Dinka, Nuer), Beja, Fur, Zaghawa, and others.

Religious Conflicts

Religious tensions are not the primary source of contemporary conflicts in the Horn of Africa. They occur primarily in Sudan, which has been shaken by armed conflict since independence in 1956. The dividing line runs between the Arab, Muslim north and the animist-Christian black-inhabited south before the independence of Southern Sudan⁹. For more than 20 years there has been conflict in Sudan between the central government in Khartoum, which was trying to impose Muslim legislation on all citizens, and guerrillas from the Sudan People's Liberation Army defending the rights of the Christian and animist minority. The effects of these wars and tensions created, political instability and economic catastrophe resulting in a massive refugee phenomenon¹⁰.

⁸ *The World Factbook. Field listing- ethnic groups*, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2075.html>.

⁹ *Persecution on the grounds of religion in the world*, "From a Foreign Land" April 2003, No. 18, http://unhcr.pl/publikacje/zobceziemi/nr18/przesladowania_relijne_swiat.php.

¹⁰ *Religiously-based civil unrest and warfare*, http://www.religioustolerance.org/curr_war.htm; *Religion, Nationalism and Peacemaking in Sudan*, United States Institute of Peace, <http://www.usip.org/religionpeace/rehr/sudanconf/concept.html>.

The Course and Impact of Contemporary Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

Sudan - North-South Conflicts

In 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was founded by Colonel John Garanga. In 1985, President Jafaar al-Nimeiri was overthrown by a popular uprising in Khartoum caused by a collapsing economy, the war in the south, and political repression.

In 1986, after parliamentary elections, the military handed over power to Sadiq al-Mahdi's cabinet, which introduced the principles of an Islamic republic. The Sudanese government supported the Eritrean separatists, and in retaliation, Ethiopia assisted General Garanga. In 1988, the government made a deal with the SPLA to end the civil war in exchange for the abolition of sharia, but the deal was opposed by the National Muslim Front. In 1989 there was another military coup, resulting in the formation of the Muslim-Arab military government of the OHA under the leadership of Omar Hasan Ahmed al-Bashir. In the south of the country, the war with SPLA rebels continued. According to David de Chanda, this conflict resulted in the deaths of 1.6 million people between 1983 and 1995, with a further 5 million leaving the embattled areas¹¹.

On 20 July 2002, a protocol of peace talks between the Sudanese government and the Sudan's People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was signed in Machakos, Kenya. This protocol became an important point in the search for a solution to the long-standing conflict in Sudan. The agreement dealt with defining the status of Southern Sudan in Sudan's politics and constitution, as well as the problem of marginalised areas of Sudan (Nubian Mountains, Engessenna, Beja regions). The Machakos Protocol was a significant development, because it proposes legal, political and constitutional solutions arrived at through peaceful negotiations. Until then, relations between Khartoum and southern Sudan had been very tense, characterised by much distrust and dishon-

¹¹ D. de Chand, *South Sudan Claims for Right of Self-Determination*, http://www.sas.upenn.edu/african-studies/articles_gen/de_chand.html.

esty on both sides. Since 1956, when Sudan gained independence, the most important decisions concerning the country were taken in the north, which inevitably led to conflict with the south. While attempts have been made to resolve contentious issues, such as the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, giving 10 years of relative peace¹², these have not led to a final resolution of the conflict. The Addis Ababa Agreement was soon broken when Khartoum formally declared Sudan an Islamic state.

After years of bloody war, in which many of the country's citizens lost their lives, infrastructure and economy were destroyed¹³, the parties to the conflict understood that the military option will not bring a solution to the problem.

The parties to the Sudan peace talks were primarily the Sudanese government and the SPLM, but observers from the US, UK, Norway, Italy, representatives of IGAD (*Intergovernmental Authority Development*) were also participated. The signing of the Machakos Protocol raised hopes for a final resolution of the Sudanese conflict. The agreement was accepted by both the Sudanese and the international community. It guaranteed the right to self-determination for southern Sudan and thus eliminated the main cause of the conflict¹⁴.

Conflict in Darfur

Darfur, an impoverished region of Sudan, was the scene of a bloody conflict between the government and the rebels, the source of which was the Khartoum government's disregard for the situation in this part of the country. Additional elements of the conflict were the government's discrimination against the black population in favour of the Arab population. Historically, there have always been sharp disagreements between the two communities over a dispute of land and the right to own grazing land for animals. These conflicts have evolved and

¹² *Sudan's long road to justice and peace*, "Horn of Africa Bulletin" July-August 2002, No. 4, Vol. 14, p. 1.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

led to appalling losses, claiming thousands of lives and changed to the biggest hotbed of unrest in 2004.

The rebels in the Darfur region were organised into two groups: The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The government in Khartoum, in a bid to crush the opposition forces, began mobilising the Arab Militia, the so-called *Janjaweed*, who committed numerous attacks against the non-Arab population of Darfur. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people fled their homes and thousands were murdered¹⁵. According to UN figures, a total of more than two million people have become victims of this conflict. Many people have been forced to flee their homes. According to the UN, 432,000 people in western Darfur, 321,000 in the northern part and 233,000 in southern Darfur have become internal refugees. A further 120,000 people have fled to neighbouring Chad¹⁶. The situation has caused deep concern in the international community. On 10 June 2004, the leaders of the G 8 countries Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US called on the Sudanese government to immediately disarm the Arab Militia carrying out ethnic cleansing in Darfur¹⁷. The UN Security Council on 26 May 2004, strongly protesting against attacks on civilians, sent a strong message to the Sudanese government, demanding an end to its support for *Janjaweed* militants¹⁸.

The conflict in Darfur has not gone unnoticed by African organisations either. The African Union has decided to send 300 peacekeepers to Darfur, plus up to 150 unarmed observers¹⁹. According to the director of the African Union's peace and security section, Sam Ibok, the peacekeepers came from Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania and Botswana. What remained unclear was whether the actions against civilians in Sudan amounted to the crime of genocide. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan avoided using the word genocide for fear of the possible

¹⁵ http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/_1/hi/world/africa/3496731.stm.

¹⁶ *Darfur conflict claims 2 million victims*, <http://www.afrol.com/articles/12350>.

¹⁷ *Great powers demand action on Darfur*, Afrol News, <http://www.afrol.com//articles/13318>.

¹⁸ *UN condemns Sudan over Darfur ethnic cleansing*, Afrol News: <http://www.afrol.com/articles/12696>.

¹⁹ *African Union Force ready to deploy in Sudan*, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200407090781.html>.

consequences of not proving the crime. In contrast, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated that “(...) there are some indicators and elements that signal the possibility of using the term genocide, but it is still too early to reach a definitive conclusion”²⁰.

Somalia

In 1976, the legitimate *Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party* (SRSP) was founded and its leader Siyad Barre became president. After the failed attempted annexation of the Ogaden (1977), Somalia cut relations with Ethiopia-supporting countries USSR and Cuba, shifting to a pro-Western orientation. The US became the main political partner of the Somali government. In 1980, the US was allowed to station its troops at a military base in Barbera. In the 1980s, a deepening economic crisis, drought and famine and dictatorial rule intensified anti-government sentiment (including the formation of the United Somali Congress), and clan antagonism increased, especially in the north of the country.

The outspoken opposition emerged after a failed military coup in 1978 by rebellious officers mainly from the Majertain clan. They formed the first resistance movement against the Somali government, obtaining political asylum in Ethiopia. The opposition aimed to overthrow the government of Siyad Barre and to restore the previous state associated with the strengthening of the socialist system²¹. It is important to note here the characteristic mechanism of using opposition groups of states in conflict for their own ends: in the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) based in Ethiopia fought alongside the Ethiopian army, while a group called the Western Somaliland Front (WSLF), with financial and material support from the Barre government, fought against the Ethiopian army²².

²⁰ *US House calls Darfur “genocide”*, http://www.nwes.bbc.co.uk/go/fr/_2/hi/africa/3853157.stm.

²¹ M. Bongartz, *The civil war in Somalia: Its genesis and dynamics*, Current African Issues 11, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1991, p. 20.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 21.

Another organisation that originated in Ethiopia and was supported by its authorities is the Somali National Movement (SNM). In 1991, it unilaterally proclaimed the independent Republic of Somaliland in the former British protectorate (president - A. Ahmed Ali of the SNM, since 1993 M.H.I. Egal), which was not recognised by the international community. In the northeastern region, however, the Republic of Puntland (in 1998), under the control of a local clan, proclaimed its independence. Puntland has also failed to find international recognition, although it maintained stability, meets basic social needs and even trades through a port in the Gulf of Aden²³.

The rivalry and violent struggle for power of a dozen clan-based groups led in 1992 to the destruction of state structures and the mass exile of the Somali population from famine and civil war (mainly to Ethiopia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen); probably 100,000 people died, 500,000 left their place of residence and sought refuge in neighbouring countries²⁴.

The conflicts in Somalia are also rooted in the extremely complicated relations between different clans. For example, the Cisse clan supported the SNM, while members of the Gadabursi clan formed their pro-government movement called the *Somali Democratic Alliance* (SDA). In southern Somalia, members of the Hawiye clan formed an organisation called *The Somali Congress* (UCS), supported by the Digil and Rahanweyn clans and in opposition to the Isaq clan. In 1989, some 300 deserters from government troops formed *The Somali Patriotic Movement* (SPM), and supporters of this grouping were mainly members of the Ogadeeni clan. Since the early summer of 1989, these two groups have carried out a number of successful attacks against the government, resulting in fighting breaking out in the Somali capital Mogadishu in 1990. By the end of 1990, USC forces controlled much of Mogadishu. President Barre managed to escape and was hiding in one of the military quarters²⁵.

²³ *History: early and colonial periods*, The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition, 2004, <http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/world/A0861179.html>.

²⁴ M. Bongartz, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

²⁵ Ibidem.

External Causes of the Somali Crisis

The Somali crisis, although having its origins in the internal situation of the country, did not arise without the influence of the global changes that took place in the world in the 1990s. The collapse of communism fostered the development of ideas about political freedom, human rights, and democracy. However, the implementation of these principles has rarely been peaceful; in most African countries, political transitions have caused unrest and often anarchy. The overthrow of dictatorial regimes triggered crises as a way of seeking democracy²⁶.

Internal Determinants of Conflict

The Somali community is considered to be the most homogeneous in the Horn of Africa region; almost all Somalis follow the same religion (Islam), speak the same language and have the same ancestry, but this has not prevented the emergence of bloody conflicts. These are mainly due to the great clan diversity that is an immanent feature of this community. After the unification of northern and southern Somalia in 1960, it became a fragmented yet united state under a dictatorial regime and a ruling clan. Therefore, the northern Somali community was discriminated against and treated as a second-class citizen, for example, more than 95% of development projects and student scholarships were allocated to people from southern Somalia. All these elements have resulted in Somalia being a fractured country, with the rift between the different regions widening rapidly and leading to separatist movements (Somaliland, Puntland).

Ethiopia

Dominance over Ethiopia was sought unsuccessfully by the British and Italians. In 1930, Emperor Haile Selassie I ascended the Ethio-

²⁶ A. Musse Jibril, *The Somali Crisis: Prospects and Options*, in *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia*, ed. by M.A. Mohamed Salih, L. Wohlgemuth, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1994, p. 47.

pian throne. Italian troops occupied the country in 1935, forcing the Emperor into exile. Following the victory of British troops over the Italians, Haile Selassie came to power in 1941. During his reign, he incorporated Eritrea (in 1952, as a federated state) and the Ogaden into Ethiopia²⁷.

In 1974, a military putsch led by Mengistu Haile Mariam took place due to a very bad economic situation and repeated famines. The communist military regime remained in power until 1991, thanks to economic and military aid from communist countries, especially the Soviet Union, East Germany and Cuba. In May 1991, the opposition succeeded in overthrowing the ruling regime and seized power in the state. In April 1993, a referendum was held in Eritrea, which resulted in the former north-eastern province of Ethiopia, Eritrea, becoming independent.

As a result, the political situation in Ethiopia became very unstable, with armed clashes between supporters of the ruling People's Revolutionary Democratic Front party and opposition forces. This conflict was extended to border conflict with Eritrea²⁸.

External Conflicts

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea began on 6 May 1998, when Eritrea occupied border areas it considered as an integral part of Eritrea.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan immediately took steps towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict - appointing Algerian Ambassa-

²⁷ *Ethiopia: early history*, infoplease, <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858046html>; *Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, Altapedia Online, Countries A to Z, <http://www.altapedia.com/online/countries/ethiopia.htm>; *History of Eritrea*, World History 1952-1991, <http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/eastafrica/eritrea193952.html>.

²⁸ *Background Notes: Federal Republic of Ethiopia*, March 1998, US Department of State, Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict Page, <http://dehai.org/conflict/home.htm?history.htm>; History, Encyclopedia-Eritrea, infoplease, <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858026.htm>.

dor Mohammed Sahnoun as UN Special Envoy, appointed to mediate with the African Union, with the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea²⁹.

In June 2000, Algeria and the African Union organisation brought about a cessation of hostilities as a result of mediation. The Algerian agreement obliged both parties to agree to the Permanent Court of Arbitration's consideration of the disputed border issue and to unconditionally accept the court's decision³⁰. In July of the same year, the UN Security Council established UNMEE (United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) to monitor the ceasefire³¹.

In September 2000, the UN deployed 4,200 peacekeepers to oversee the agreement until the border was fixed³².

The final settlement of the dispute obliging both parties to accept the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and to comply with the agreements reached in Algeria was announced in The Hague on 13 April 2002³³.

Ethiopia immediately reacted by disagreeing with the verdict of the Court of Arbitration, stressing that the disputed borders would remain under its sovereignty. On this issue, the European Union unequivocally stressed the need to implement the peace agreement in accordance with the final verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which turned out to be less favourable to Ethiopia, which was allocated less disputed land than it had requested.

The decision of the arbitration court in the Hague is in principle, the beginning of the end of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. As assured by the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy Lloyd Axworthy and the UN Special Representative Joseph Legwaila, by the time the Peace Mission's mandate expires on 30 September 2004, they will

²⁹ F. Mohammed, *OAU Framework Agreement: Take it or Leave it*, http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/articles/articles/february-99/Fatima%20Mohammed_1.htm.

³⁰ *Asmara and Addis: Securing a lasting peace*, "Horn of Africa Bulletin" March-April 2002, No. 2, Vol. 14, p. 1.

³¹ <http://www.un.org/depts/dpk.o/missions/unmee/>.

³² *Intolerance or peaceful coexistence*, "Horn of Africa Bulletin" September-October 2001, No. 5, Vol. 13, p. 10.

³³ *UN Council hails border promises*, "Horn of Africa Bulletin" March-April 2002, No. 2, Vol. 14, p. 10.

have done everything possible to bring the border conflict to an end³⁴. This settlement sends a clear message to the people of both countries, who have suffered the greatest losses due to the war. This bloody conflict had a great impact on the functioning of both nations in the border area - schooling was interrupted, trade and agriculture froze. Millions of dollars were spent on building up military strength and purchasing weapons. More than 70,000 people lost their lives, 300,000 fled their homes and about 70,000 ended up in refugee camps³⁵.

Costs of War

Ethiopia suffered a huge negative economic impact from the war with Eritrea. At the outbreak of war, the Ethiopian government mobilised a significant military force and mobilised financial and material resources. The size of the Ethiopian army was increased from 60,000 to 350,000 soldiers. War expenditures increased from \$95 million in 1997/1998 to \$777 million in 1999/2000, representing 49.8% of the total state budget expenditure³⁶. In total, the war with Eritrea cost Ethiopia \$2.9 billion.

In addition to the direct cost of the war, Ethiopia has also suffered other losses. There has been a reduction or freeze in external development aid: annual grants have fallen from US\$700 million to US\$500 million. Also, the severance of trade and economic relations with Eritrea caused huge financial losses³⁷. The country's economic and social infrastructure was destroyed.

At the same time as the war was going on, 8 million Ethiopian citizens were suffering from the drought that had once again hit the country³⁸. The government, however, did not allocate any resources for dis-

³⁴ <http://allafrica.com/stories/20040790864.html>.

³⁵ *UN Council hails border promises...*, p. 10.

³⁶ *War cost over USD 2.9 billion*, "Horn of Africa Bulletin" July-August 2001, No. 4, Vol. 13, p. 9.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

³⁸ *The agreement as proposed by OAU*, "Horn of Africa Bulletin" March-April 2000, No. 2, Vol. 12, p. 9.

aster relief and even criticised the international community for not responding to the famine in Ethiopia. It is worth noting here that Ethiopia was ruled by a dictatorial minority government drawn from one ethnic group during the war. It is a government that does not enjoy widespread acceptance by its citizens but exists through military power. Corrupt supporters of the pro-government party have become the largest importers and exporters in the trade industry and owners of most of the major companies. Mechanisms to control power are non-existent. Elections are manipulated and those who protest are repressed, tortured, killed or at best find refuge outside the country³⁹.

Internal Conflicts

The internal situation in Ethiopia was also very tense. Since 1991, the country has been under the leadership of a government dominated by the ethnic Tigre minority, represented by *The Tigre People's Liberation Front* (TPLF). The largest opposition grouping is *The Oromo Liberation Front* (OLF), waging an armed struggle for autonomy in the Oromiya region. Oromiya is Ethiopia's largest administrative region with an Oromo population of over 50 million. The OLF accuses the government of human rights violations and repression against the population⁴⁰. According to the OSG (*Oromia Support Group*), by December 2002 more than 3,000 people had been murdered and 857 suspected opposition supporters were reported missing. Most of these were of Oromo origin. The OSG also reported that thousands of people have been arrested and placed in hidden prisons where they were tortured. The government denies the existence of such prisons⁴¹.

Repression also affects the most active communities - students, pupils and teachers. Since the ethnic minority seized power, acts of rape and violence against the aforementioned social groups have been fre-

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ M. Ford, *Ethiopia: current armed conflicts*, <http://www.iifhr.com/Armed%20conflict%20Program/ArmEthiopia.htm>.

⁴¹ *Oromo Support Group*, <http://www.oromo.org/>.

quent. According to the OSA (*Oromo Studies Association*), in January 2000⁴², more than 1,000 students from various universities in Addis Ababa of Oromo origin were arrested and suspended. The OSA, in its commentary on these events, states that the persecution of academics is purely political and that the government aims to degrade the political intellectual potential of the country's largest ethnic group. Thus, for example, on 20 January 2004, 350 participants in a peaceful demonstration at Addis Ababa University were arrested and tortured. The students and academics were protesting against the unjustified arrests of students two days earlier. On 24 January 2004, Human Rights Watch published a 52-page document describing the repression of students, pupils and academics⁴³.

In 2001, a strike broke out at Addis Ababa University during which students demanded the right to organise student Council, publish a newspaper and freedom of assembly. State authorities responded with fire, storming the University's dormitories and other facilities; 40 students were killed and many arrested. Similar events took place in Oromia, where five secondary school students were killed. The police, as a cursory justification for the use of sharp weapons against the youths, cited that they could not afford to buy tear gas and water cannons and threatened further use of weapons in the event of protests.

Other forms of repression of the scientific community are also being applied by the state authorities. For example, a system of staff evaluation, the so-called *gimgema*, has been imposed on universities in favour of those associated with the ideology of the ruling party. For this reason, many people with a different political orientation have been forced to leave their jobs. In addition, independent teachers' associations have been persecuted - their authorities have been arrested and their property confiscated.

The ruling authorities in Ethiopia seek to maintain their dominance at all costs. Elections are rigged and manipulated. Although opposition parties are formally allowed to participate in the elections, they

⁴² OSA Ad Hoc Committee: *Urgent Appeal; Help Suspended Oromo Students from University and other Higher Educations*, <http://mysan.de/article/4027.html>.

⁴³ *Ethiopia: Investigate Torture by Police*, *Human Rights Watch*, <http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/18/ethiop.8131.html>.

are deprived of the opportunity to campaign, have no access to the media and any protests against election rigging are bloodily suppressed.

Eritrea

Eritrea was a northeastern province of Ethiopia until the end of the 19th century. In 1889 it was overrun by the Italians, who annexed it to Italian East Africa in 1936. In 1941, the British ousted the Italians and took control of the territory. In 1952, as a federated autonomous province, it became part of Ethiopia again. Emperor Haile Selassie I abolished Eritrean autonomy in 1962; this caused discontent among Eritreans and sparked a movement seeking the country's independence. In 1991, following the overthrow of the dictatorship and the rise to power of an opposition preaching democratisation, Ethiopian troops left Eritrea.

In April 1993, a referendum on the country's independence, supervised by UN observers, was held, which resulted in the proclamation of an independent Eritrea. In 1998, a border war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Fighting escalated significantly in May 2000, despite several declarations by both sides in the conflict of their willingness to make peace.

Ethiopian-Eritrean war

According to analysts and diplomats, the reasons for the escalation of the war lie in the unresolved economic problems of both countries. In 1997, Eritrea issued its currency, which prompted an immediate response from the Ethiopian authorities in switching to hard currency, i.e. the USD, in trade settlements.

The leaders of the two countries were close associates during the guerrilla struggle against Ethiopia's former dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam. After the overthrow of Mengistu in 1991, Eritrea became independent, however, even then Eritreans played a major role in Ethiopia's economic and political life. Such cooperation was possible until there was an agreement between the leaders of the two countries. However, a rivalry quickly developed between the two, initially in the nature of

an economic dispute and eventually a border dispute, which eventually led to the outbreak of war. It seems that the restoration of the previous state of affairs, or at least the establishment of partnership relations, was not possible as long as both leaders remained in power⁴⁴.

The two-and-a-half-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea came to a formal end on 18 June 2000 without a final settlement of the course of the disputed border. The leaders of the two countries agreed to resolve the issue through an independent border commission - an agreement on this issue was signed in December 2000 in the Algerian capital, Algiers⁴⁵. However, the end of the war did not mean a solution to the huge social problems resulting from it. According to the UN, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the Eritrean government, 1.5 million people, or 40% of Eritrea's population, were affected by the war and the drought that followed⁴⁶. A third of the Eritrean population, having left their places of residence, have taken refuge in the hard-to-reach mountains, where it is also difficult to deliver humanitarian aid. An additional complication was the onset of the rainy season, which made life outside the refugee camps impossible. The cessation of the war also did not at all mean that the refugees could return to their homes. The Ethiopian army destroyed everything it met on its way, including food reserves, livestock and infrastructure. There were also mines left behind after the passage of the troops, which were life-threatening. The refugees did not really have anything to return to. Some of them took refuge in neighbouring countries: Djibouti, Sudan and Yemen⁴⁷.

Djibouti

In 1884, France purchased the territories around the Gulf of Tadjura and declared the creation of a French colony called French Somalia with its capital in the city of Djibouti. In 1946, the country gained the status

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 8.

⁴⁵ *Eritrea - Ethiopia: Kofi Annan urges resolution of border dispute*, IRIN, <http://www.irinnews.org.report.asp>.

⁴⁶ *Eritrea needs massive humanitarian aid*, "Horn of Africa Bulletin" May-June 2000, No. 3, Vol. 2, p. 5.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 7.

of an overseas territory of France. In July 1957, Djibouti was granted autonomy. Following a referendum on independence in May 1977, Djibouti gained the status of an independent state. Since then, there has been an ongoing conflict between rival political factions in the country, which escalated into a civil war in 1991. It is fought by members of the Afar tribe on the one hand and forces supporting the government on the other. The opposition forces are boycotting the ongoing elections, accusing the government of manipulating the results⁴⁸.

Conclusion

The intrastate conflicts in the Horn of Africa are mostly caused because of the ethnic-based states, where one ethnic group monopolizes every aspect of political and economic power over the other ethnic groups.

Although ethnicity, differences in values, religion, ideological perceptions could be mentioned, often as some of the factors, the root cause of the conflict can be traced back to the era of colonialism. Territorial boundaries originally brought about by colonial partition are today the sources of interstate conflict in the region.

One of the crucial prerequisites for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and maintenance of peace agreements is based on the political willingness of leaders in the region. Personal ambitions, corruption, incompetence and lack of accountability of decision-makers, aggravate political, social and economic instability in the Horn of Africa.

In the past decades and still recently hundreds of thousands of people have fallen victim to conflicts caused by ruthless dictators of these countries. In addition to this, the Horn of Africa was also a battlefield between the rival superpowers during the Cold War, which contributed to the devastation of the social and economic life of the people.

The origins of contemporary conflicts in the Horn of Africa are very complex. They are rooted in the historical legacy of colonialism, in the disintegration processes associated with the end of Cold War in-

⁴⁸ *History: Djibouti, Nation by Nation*, <http://www.nationbynation.com/djibouti/history2.html>.

ternational agreements; ethnic diversity and religious conflicts are not insignificant. However, this does not change the fact that conflicts are human-made and the responsibility for them lies with the people who can influence them: state leaders. In the Horn of Africa, all too often conflicts are attempted to be resolved by violence and military force, at the expense of already poor societies. This creates political, economic and social crises and disasters. It seems that the only way to solve these difficult problems are through dialogue and the peaceful resolution of all disagreements, building democracy, respecting the right to coexist and co-determine.

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Chapter 5

Ethiopia as a Regional Power – the Context of Relations with Neighbouring States

Introduction

Ethiopia is the strongest regional power among the states of the Horn of Africa. It is the second most populous country on the continent. This chapter refers to the past and recent relations with neighbours of Ethiopia, regarding its dominant position. The military intervention in Somalia, the war with Eritrea and their post-war relations, the peacekeeping mission in the Republic of South Sudan and other relations at the regional level are thoroughly analysed.

A regional power in international relations is understood as a potential stabilising force or vice versa by virtue of its influence through military, economic or other forces. Such a measure is usually relative and only relevant in relation to a given region. So, the term 'superpower' in this case should not refer to a commonly understood world power. A contemporary competing phenomenon to regional power is regional integration. Within the scope of the study of the influence of regional powers, their participation and the role they play in the integration process should also be considered.

In which part of Africa, which country plays an important role? In general, there is no clear answer. Some states have already lost their former glory and are not regionally relevant today, while states

with such relevance are emerging. In terms of regional order, it is possible to list those states that meet the aforementioned criteria on the basis of their degree of commitment to peace-making or otherwise as an effective regional leader primarily in times of internal and regional crisis.

This chapter is limited to the most important role played by Ethiopia, as a regional *leader* (power) in the “Horn of Africa” region¹. The term is variously understood. Some consider this region to include countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, and some will include Kenya, Sudan and Uganda more broadly. This chapter, however, does not include Uganda.

The Theoretical Concept of “Regional Power”

The international relations literature lacks clear analytical and empirical tools, how regional powers are formed and the different influences they exert. The literature also lacks instruments for determining the configuration and hierarchy of states as regional powers. Due to the complexity of this topic, a variety of approaches are needed to determine whether a state plays a leading role in a region or not. Undoubtedly, in the structure of the international and regional system, various factors among others in the distribution of natural resources can provide an important impetus for the emergence of regional powers².

According to empirical observation, the presence of a preponderance of regional powers does not necessarily lead to hegemony but can serve as a guarantee and a tool for regional stability. Here it should be emphasised that the behaviour of regional powers, however, cannot be treated in a uniform and universal manner. In the history of the world, super-power status has not been and is not a permanent feature; on the one

¹ See: P. Woodward, *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, New York 2003, pp. 1-3; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/8135/Horn-of-Africa>.

² See: D. Nolte, *How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics*, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/staff/nolte/publications/how_to_compare_nolte.pdf.

hand, there is a decline, while on the other hand, a new superpower is born, and some have the chance to survive for a long period of time. According to Quincy Wright, great powers that had ceased to exist, such as Prussia, Austria and Russia, which emerged as great powers in the seventh century. By contrast, the United States of America did not emerge as a superpower until the 20th century. France and Great Britain maintained superpower status for a long period in history³.

Explaining the conceptual theme of “superpower”, Martin Wight states that, the best way to describe the definition of superpower is through historical facts due to the lack of a common consensus of the concept among scholars. At the same time, he writes that the characteristic of a superpower is to believe in one’s own forces and to wage war against the forces of an opponent⁴.

The same state in each region may be referred to differently, from different perspectives, as a *great power*, *middle power* or *regional power*. These concepts are not mutually exclusive, rather they are complementary. He describes the concept of *regional power* as a state that is influential and powerful, and in some geographical regions or sub-regions; especially in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. These same states in a global context are also referred to as great powers or middle powers. There is a difference between regional powers in many aspects. In general, in order to give a definition of a regional power, the following elements relating to the state must be taken into account⁵:

- Leading position in the region geographically, economically, militarily and demographically, organisationally (politically), where the objective is a regional project.
- Significant impact on regional affairs (including all activities and outcomes).
- The delimitation of geopolitical and politico-ideological boundaries, as well as the construction of the region itself, is significantly influenced by regional structures;

³ *What is a great power?* <http://globalmakeover.com/sites/economicreconstruction.com/static/JonRynn/FirstChapterDissertation.pdf>.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ Ibidem.

- The definition and expression of a shared regional identity or project;
- Ensuring the collective interest of the region or participation;
- Defining a regional security strategy;
- Recognition by the states of the region of the leading role of a particular state, or at least respect by other states inside and outside the region;
- To represent their own and the region's interests internationally;

The existence of a regional power in every region of the world is not necessary. The above-mentioned situations are therefore necessary prerequisites for the emergence of a regional power. A regional power is not limited to its capabilities but also needs supporters from other states in the same region, whose aim is to secure its position.

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever believe that the possibility of a regional power works well in their region, while its importance on the international stage is negligible or not very visible. Sometimes due to global power rivalry, however, there are instances of participation in the international game⁶.

Ethiopia's role in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1996, replacing the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, which was founded in 1986. It is a regional organisation with the primary objectives of ensuring peace, conflict prevention, economic cooperation, promoting humanitarian, food security and environmental issues for countries in the region⁷. Ethio-

⁶ B. Buzan, O. Weaver, *Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security*, Cambridge 2003, p. 37.

⁷ *Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - Peace and Security*, http://translate.google.pl/translate?hl=pl&langpair=en|en&u=http://aros.trustafrica.org/index.php/Inter-Governmental_Authority_on_Development_%28IGAD%29_%25E2%2580%2593_Peace_and_Security_Architecture.

pia, as one of the most important countries in the region, plays a key role here.

Table 1. Population of countries in the Horn of Africa, as of 2011

State	Population
Djibouti	496 374
Eritrea	5 880 000
Ethiopia	85 237 338
Kenya	34 707 817
Somalia	9 832 017
Sudan	39 154 490

Source: *Africa Population 2011*, <http://exploredia.com/africa-population-2011/>.

IGAD member states called on Ethiopia to support the campaign of Kenya, Somalia and African Union forces in the fight against the rebels (*Al-Shabaab*). The positive response of the Ethiopian authorities in stabilising the situation in Somalia was confirmed by IGAD member heads of state⁸.

Table 2. Number of military personnel by Horn of Africa country, 1997-2004

State	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Djibouti	9 600	9 600	9 600	9 600	9 600	9 850	9 850	9 850
Eritrea	46 000	47100	180 000-200 000	200 000-250 000	171 900	170 000	202 200	201 750
Ethiopia	120 000	120 000	325 50	352 500	252 500	250 000	162 500	182 500
Kenya	24 200	24 200	24 200	22 200	23 120	23 120	24 120	24 120
Sudan	79 700	94 700	94 700	104 500	117 000	117 000	1045 00	104 800

*The table does not include data from Somalia, due to the absence of a central government since 1991.

Source: S. Adejumobi, M. Binega, *Ethiopia*, <http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI06OmHu/SIPRI06OmHu03.pdf>.

⁸ *Regional IGAD member states call upon Ethiopia to back anti-Al Shabaab operation in Somalia*, <http://terrorfreesomalia.blogspot.com/2011/11/igad-wants-ethiopia-to-play-role-in-al.htm>.

In an exclusive interview with the Ethiopian Agency ENA, Ambassador Dina on Ethiopia's role in IGAD, stated that Ethiopia is playing a key role in strengthening IGAD's capacity to ensure peace and security and economic integration in the region. According to the diplomat, the conduct of a peaceful referendum in Sudan, efforts to ensure sustainable peace in Somalia, and the repudiation of destructive acts by the Eritrean government are some of the key achievements that have played a crucial role in the organization under Ethiopian leadership since 2008. Ambassador Dina on Eritrea (a hostile state to Ethiopia) said "Ethiopia and IAGD member states have the support of the African Union to curb the destabilising acts of the Eritrean government, (...) the destructive acts of the Eritrean government are a threat to the region. The UN-imposed sanctions on Eritrea are a success for IGAD", thus expressing the achievement of a political goal through a regional organisation. Besides, he expressed his intention to connect rail and road with the countries of the region, in order to revive the economic sphere⁹.

IGAD's Director of Peace and Security, Yufnalis Okubo, also affirmed Ethiopia's key role in maintaining security and stability in IGAD member states¹⁰.

Ethiopia's Role in the Somali Conflict

By far the majority of Somalis, in Somalia as well as those living abroad, believe that Ethiopia is interfering excessively in Somalia's internal affairs.

Ethiopia justified its actions in the fight against terrorism in that part of the world as an expression of concern for the Somali people

⁹ *Ethiopia: Official details country's diplomatic role in Horn of Africa*, http://www.ethiosomali.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1128:ethiopia-official-details-countrys-diplomatic-role-in-horn-of-africa&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50.

¹⁰ *Ethiopia leading country to support, implement IGAD's plans, programs*, <http://www.newsdire.com/news/744-ethiopia-leading-country-to-support-implement-igads-plans-programs.html>.

and friendship in relations between the two sides. Beyond this, Ethiopia presents the threat of terrorism in Somalia as having a direct impact on the situation in Ethiopia.

Table 3. Ethiopia's defence expenditure from 1988 to 2009 in national currency (Bir).

Year	ETB military expenditure (National currency) in millions	GDP (%)
1988	1 494	6.67
1989	1 741	7.38
1990	1 509	6.03
1991	681	2.46
1992	750	2.57
1993	889	2.37
1994	737	1.85
1995	772	1.62
1996	835	1.56
1997	2 190	3.79
1998	4 336	7.81
1999	6 842	11.64
2000	3 307	4.96
2001	2 610	3.84
2002	2 341	3.52
2003	2 452	3.34
2004	2 920	3.37
2005	3 009	2.83
2006	3 005	2.28
2007	3 453	2.01
2008	4 000	1.61
2009	4 788	1.42

Source: *Military expenditure at a historic low, Ethiopia*, <http://danielberhane.wordpress.com/2010/11/28/military-expenditure-at-a-historic-low-ethiopia/>.

When analysing Ethiopia's policy of domination in the region, it is important to consider the reasons for intervention from different sides. The past history of the two countries' relations and the socio-political problems of the Somali population in Ethiopia, seem to be the direct reasons for the decision to intervene in Somalia.

The alleged armed actions of opponents of the government's policies in Ethiopia, with protection and support precisely in Somalia are among the main reasons. The political chaos in Somalia reinforced Ethiopia's position as a leader in the Horn of Africa region. Another very important objective for Ethiopia seems to be, to clear or stem any kind of Eritrean influence in Somalia, which could be a potential threat to the Ethiopian government.

An Attempt to Stabilise Through Reconciliation

Ethiopia expresses its involvement in Somalia as both altruistic, reciprocal and neutral, whereas Somalia as a neighbouring state is mired in armed conflict and instability. Ethiopian leaders also argue that they have continuously tried for eighteen years to restore peace and stability in Somalia through processes of national reconciliation as well as military assistance¹¹.

Ethiopian leaders also state that they have organised several reconciliation conferences for Somalia, inviting Somali faction leaders twice in Ethiopian cities; including the capital in Addis Ababa and other cities such as Awasa and Sodere. Besides, Ethiopians also supported other Somali reconciliation initiatives that took place in neighbouring African countries such as Djibouti and Kenya.

In addition, Ethiopia hosts and has hosted hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees showing the action of a positive role in Somalia. Ethiopian leaders explain the military's participation in Somalia as a selfless activity, where risks can cost the lives of Ethiopian troops and absorb huge financial resources to help stabilise¹².

Marcel Lossi, writes that the effects of a conflict in a country are felt more in a neighbouring country. Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, in 2006, can be seen in this context, although it is not impossible to categorise this intervention in terms of another category, e.g. the aim of

¹¹ *Ethiopian involvement in Somalia*, http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2008/may/ethiopian_involvement_in_somalia.aspx.

¹² *Ibidem*.

the intervention may be to strengthen the position of the intervening state in order to reformulate the pursuit of its own interests. In this case, the intervening state chooses strategic objectives using the weakened position of the opponent. Ethiopia has had a long-standing conflict with Somalia, starting with Menilik II's annexation of the Ogaden (the current part of Ethiopia inhabited by Somali people) late in the 19th century. The ambition to create a "Greater Somalia" was born with the aim of uniting all Somali-inhabited lands. Concerned about a strong Somali, Ethiopia exploited the favourable situation in Somali to realise its hegemony¹³.

The above concepts are also confirmed by Piotr Wolejko, describing the situation in Somalia and Ethiopia's intention to intervene in Somalia. The "Islamists", known as the Somali Taliban, have effectively restored order in the territories they control. They introduced Sharia, disarmed militias and various armed gangs, and chased out *warlords* ruling particular districts of the capital. They also stopped the activities of pirates operating within the Somali coast. At the same time, the Islamists made no secret of their antipathy to the West and sympathised with al-Qaeda. This fact contributed to their rapid removal from power. Inspired and supported by the United States of America, Ethiopia decided to intervene militarily to overthrow the Islamists' rule. However, Addis Ababa had its reasons for taking military action¹⁴.

Table 4. Number of Ethiopian military personnel between 1989 and 2008.

Year	Military personnel
1989	250 000
1990	250 000
1991	120 000
1992	120 000
1993	120 000
1994	120 000

¹³ M. Lossi, *The Failure System: The Role of External Actors in the Somali State Collapse*, Norderstedt 2009, pp. 23-24.

¹⁴ P. Wolejko, *Policjanci Rogu Afryki*, <http://pulaski.pl/pl/publikacje/stanowisko-pulaskiego/385-policjanci-rogu-afryki.html>.

Table 4 – cont.

Year	Military personnel
1995	120 000
1996	120 000
1997	120 000
1998	120 000
1999	325 000
2000	352 000
2001	252 000
2002	252 000
2003	162 400
2004	182 000
2005	183 000
2006	*_
2007	138 000
2008	138 000

* no data available

Source: *Military expenditure at a historic low, Ethiopia*, <http://danielberhane.wordpress.com/2010/11/28/military-expenditure-at-a-historic-low-ethiopia/>.

A report issued by the Ethiopian authorities in 2004, confirms that the mechanism to control the threat from Somalia, by engaging in a policy of support for breakaway Somali separatists such as Puntland and Somaliland. This report also states that the idea of a “Greater Somalia” is no longer a threat¹⁵.

The lack of a strong central government and political chaos in Somalia since 1991 undoubtedly had a significant impact in the following years and up to the present time in Somali-Ethiopian relations. Ethiopia’s further intention is to establish a stable but conducive Ethiopian interest in the country¹⁶. All indications show that, as long as these conditions are not achieved, Ethiopia continues to act to realise its ambition to become a regional power.

¹⁵ T. Dagne, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace*, Washington 2011, p. 20.

¹⁶ S. Shay, *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration*, New Brunswick 2011, p. 82.

Competition for Regional Leadership Between Ethiopia and Eritrea

The new authorities in Ethiopia and Eritrea assumed power in the early 1990s after the overthrow of the communist regime in Ethiopia. The two countries cooperated closely at the beginning, through bilateral as well as multilateral agreements at the regional level. This cooperation was the fruit of a common struggle against a common enemy. However, after Eritrea's proclamation of independence, there was a divergence of interest. After Eritrea's independence, Ethiopia was denied access to the sea. Over time, Ethiopia expressed dissatisfaction with its dependence on the Eritrean port. There were also disagreements over the establishment of boundaries between Ethiopia and the newly formed state of Eritrea. Eritrea demanded that the borders to be fixed according to the 1902 agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. At that time, following Eritrea's annexation by Ethiopia in 1962, Eritrea was not treated as a country but as a province. This situation led to the outbreak of war in May 1998. The battle was fought on various fronts. In the bloody battle for the borders, Ethiopia won its victory. Various reconciliation initiatives between the two countries failed¹⁷.

Table 5: Comparison of military expenditure in national currencies (Nakfa /Bir), in the years before the outbreak of war

Year	Eritrea (Nakfa in millions)	Ethiopia (Bir in millions)
1993	539	680.8
1994	2 438.7	8 663.0
1995	770.5	672.5
1996	968.1	761.6
1997	1 634.2	786.6

Source: *Comparison of Eritrean and Ethiopian Military (Defense) Expenditures: 1993-1997*, http://www.geocities.com/~dagmawi/NewsMay99/May2_Military_Spending.html.

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the years (1998-2000) was reflected in the Somali conflict. Both countries were

¹⁷ *Human Rights Watch 2003*, New York 2003, p. 14.

involved in this conflict with the aim of consolidating their position in the region. In doing so, they also exploited rival Somali groups and clans for their own needs. Eritrea supported various Somali groups and other Ethiopian political intersection groups based in Somalia. This has resulted in cooperation with The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)¹⁸. Ethiopia, on the other hand, supported those Somali groups that were fighting anti-Ethiopian groups, such as The Somali National Front (SNF) and The Rahanwejn Resistance Army (RRA)¹⁹.

A UN report and other diplomatic sources reveal that in 2006 there were some 6,000 to 8,000 Ethiopian troops and about two thousand Eritrean troops in Somalia. There is no doubt that both countries have used the Somali conflict as a second front of competition²⁰. Ethiopia has also demonstrated a strong position in this game.

Ethiopian Peacekeepers in Sudan

After years of struggle for independence, South Sudan has regained its independence. The new state had matured into an independent state, but many problems still remained. For example, maintaining peace on the border with North Sudan, especially in the oil-rich Abyei disputed area, was under the supervision of a UN peacekeeping force. It was the first Ethiopian infantry brigade to be on the ground²¹. On this matter, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution authorising the deployment of peacekeepers to the disputed area, which lies between the northern and southern parts of Sudan. Earlier, representatives of Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan had sought

¹⁸ J. Zajączkowski, K. Zajączkowska, *Kryzys somalijski*, in: *Stosunki międzynarodowe w Afryce*, ed. by J. Milewski, W. Lizak, Warsaw 2002, p. 253.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ T. Lyons, *Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: US Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea*, Council of Foreign Affairs, New York 2007, p. 9.

²¹ *Pustynna fatamorgana*, <http://www.polityka.pl/swiat/analizy/1518228,1,sudan-pld-narodziny-panstwa.read#ixzz1p24PC6k6>.

an agreement to deploy Ethiopian peacekeepers. Accordingly, 42,000 Ethiopian troops were deployed to the Abyei region²².

Former South African President Thabo Mbeki negotiated the agreement between North Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, which was signed in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on 20 June 2011. Based on the agreement, Ethiopia deployed a total of 4,250 military and civilian police contingents. This mission was unique in many respects in terms of peacekeeping missions, including²³:

1. UNISFA (United Nations Interim Peacekeeping Force for Abyei), which was made up entirely of Ethiopian army peacekeepers.
2. The commander of the Ethiopian forces was, also the head of this mission.
3. This arrangement combines political and civilian work under one leadership.
4. This mission was one of the largest geographical area tasks covered by a UN peacekeeping mission; on average, 1 Ethiopian peacekeeper covers 2.5 square kilometres of mission area.

Since the inception of the UN, Ethiopia has participated in more than a dozen peacekeeping missions at the continental and global level. In total, Ethiopia has nearly deployed 7,000 troops participating in various UN peacekeeping missions. This makes Ethiopia one of the five largest troops of participating countries in peacekeeping missions at both African and global levels. In 1950 and 1960, Ethiopia participated in UN peacekeeping missions in Korea and Congo. More recently, Ethiopia has also participated in Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia and continues to participate in Darfur and South Sudan²⁴.

²² *The UN has approved the deployment of a peacekeeping force to the Abyei region of Sudan*, <http://pl.youth4world.com/news/polski-onz-zatwierdzila-wyslanie-sil-pokojowych-do-regionu-abyei-w-sudanie>.

²³ *U.N. Council approves Ethiopian troops for Abyei*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/27/us-sudan-abyei-un-idUSTRE75Q3I420110627>; See also, *African Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa Office*, http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1378.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

Conclusion

Analysing the history of the relations of the countries of the Horn of Africa and contemporary relations with these countries, Ethiopia in many respects holds the status of a regional leader. The influence it has with the various states in the region confirms this fact. It should be emphasised that, first and foremost, military and population potential give Ethiopia a distinct advantage. There is also a relative economic potential in relation to some countries. All indications are that this trend may continue in the future. However, a huge stumbling block is that Ethiopia is not a democratic state, promoting and carrying those values that apply to the region as a whole. Given the magnitude of the political social economic problems of the region's communities, a guarantee of a strong state that respects human rights and all kinds of democratic values enjoying full acceptance is needed.

Ethiopia deployed hundreds of its troops in Somalia, to oust rebel insurgents in 2006. Chaos and violence in the country, fragmentation of the population along clan and sub-clan lines gave Ethiopia a strong position to freely operate in Somalia without significant resistance. Generally, Ethiopia withdrew its troops in 2009, but it returned several times with small-scale troops. Another victory for Ethiopia was noted after the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998-2000 that claimed numerous injuries, dislocation of innocent citizens and left thousands dead. Following the weakness of Somalia and then Eritrea, the Ethiopian, position in the Horn of Africa became stronger. Ethiopia was also involved in the case of stabilisation of the Sudan conflict by sending its troops to the region of Abyei, a border between North Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. Ethiopia may keep its dominant position in the future, if it changes its internal political system to more open and fully democratic which could lead to positive changes in political and socioeconomic situations in the region.

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<http://articlesofinterest-kelley.blogspot.com/2011/07/africa-horn-of-africa-interactive-map.html>.

Chapter 6

The Essence of Ethiopia's Border Disputes and Conflicts with Neighbouring States

Introduction

The concept of a border in most African states occurs in two aspects. The first concerns the boundaries between ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of a single state. Against this background, there are often disputes and internal conflicts between them, which are often bilateral or multilateral in nature. The main element of dispute in this case is the historical distinctions based on the criteria of language, origin and, above all, territory, which are deeply rooted in the consciousness of the multi-ethnic society despite the creation of a common state.

The second conception of the border in Africa concerns the territory in which the states as they are today were established after independence. In this case, the borders between states were drawn according to the will and interests of the colonialists. What was not taken into account was the composition of the ethnic groups and the historical course of the border lines, prior to the colonialist era, between African states. It is this latter conception of the border that has given rise to disputes and constant conflicts, repeatedly leading to the outbreak of devastating wars between states. It can be stated emphatically, referring to the current shape of borders in Africa, that there are no states that are fully satisfied and free of feuds. Ethiopia and its neighbouring states undoubtedly fall into this category. It is bordered by six countries: to the north by

Eritrea (a former province of Ethiopia), it shares its western border with South Sudan and Sudan to the northwest, the southern areas are adjacent to Kenya, while the eastern part of the country borders Djibouti and Somalia. Border disputes exist with some of these countries to a greater or lesser extent. Ethiopia's bloodiest wars with neighbouring countries include those with Somalia and Eritrea. This chapter indicates the most important incidents and major conflicts that have occurred concerning borders between Ethiopia and its neighbours. It should be stressed, however, that this chapter does not exhaust the entire topic and only focuses on Ethiopia's border problems with Somalia and Eritrea.

Ethiopian-Somali war on border issues

The territories inhabited by Somali ethnic groups were divided between Britain, France, Italy and Ethiopia during the colonial period. The dividing line very rarely took into account the interests of the clans, which were very relevant to the Somali community. Today, these vestiges, left by the colonialists, create serious conflicts not only between Somali clans, but also between Somalia's neighbouring states¹. From 1887 to 1902, a number of agreements were signed concerning the territories and borders controlled by the occupiers². The 1897 treaty signed between Ethiopia and the UK demarcated the borders between British Somalia (Somaliland) and Ethiopia. In turn, under the 1954 British-Ethiopian agreements, the Ogaden was ceded to Ethiopia³. The area of the entire Ogaden territory is 400,000 km² which is one-third of Ethiopia's territory inhabited by people of Somali origin⁴.

¹ F. Brown, *Tragedy in Somalia: Clans, Colonizers, Superpowers, and the Cult of Personality*, <http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/origins/download/origins%20-%20may%201993%20-%20somalia.pdf>.

² Ibidem.

³ R. Pankhurst, *A History of Early Twentieth Century Ethiopia. 16 Post World War II Relations with the British*, http://www.linkethiopia.org/guide/pankhurst/twentieth_century/twentieth_century_16.html.

⁴ *Ogaden*, <http://somaliswiss.wordpress.com/2009/10/17/onlf-leader-claims-ogaden-are-arab-people-under-ethiopian-occupation/>.

First Ogaden War

Somalia gained its independence on 1 June 1960. It was then that the idea of a so-called 'Greater Somalia' was revived and became the basis of Somali nationalism. This idea envisaged the unification of all ethnically Somali lands that had previously been included in the territories of Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and north-eastern Kenya. The concept of creating a large Somali state found widespread support and acceptance among Somalis and became a source of border claims against neighbours⁵. The first objective became the recapture of the Ogaden. To this end, weapons began to be amassed, and the combat capabilities of the Somali armed forces were strengthened⁶.

On 7 February 1964, Somali troops entered Ethiopia in an attempt to take control of the Ogaden. However, the effective and swift intervention of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) led to the resolution of the conflict⁷. Meanwhile, even before the outbreak of open conflict, Somali guerrilla warfare had been ongoing between the two countries since as early as 1963 in an attempt to annex the Ogaden to Somalia. These attempts failed and Ethiopia retained control of the disputed area. In doing so, it should be remembered that the length of Somalia's border with Ethiopia is over 1,600 km⁸.

Second Ogaden War (1977-1998)

The cause of the 1977 war, was also a continuation of an armed attempt to recapture and annex the Ogaden region to Somalia. Historically, Ethiopia had always dominated the entire Horn of Africa re-

⁵ C. L. Sriram, Z. Nielsen, *Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2004, p. 32; A. Wiglin, *The Ethiopian Factor in the Somali Conflict*, <http://www.psz.pl/content/view/3932/>.

⁶ *Federal Research Division, Somalia: A Country Study*, Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish 2004, pp. 73-74.

⁷ *Ogaden War*, <http://wiadomości.onet.pl/1366205,2678,1,1,kiosksrt.html>.

⁸ P. Briggs, *Ethiopia 4th, The Bradt Global Travel*, Globe Pequot Press, Cape Town 2005, p. 3.

gion. After independence, Somalia had about 35,000 troops i.e. much less than Ethiopia. In 1969 there was a coup in Somalia. General Mohammed Siyad-Barre took over the country and Somalia was declared a socialist state. Close cooperation with the Soviet Union was established, resulting in a large amount of Soviet military aid in the 1970s. Somalia became stronger in terms of the number of tanks it had or units in the air force. At the same time, Ethiopia's internal problems during this period further created favourable conditions for Somalia to prepare for war⁹.

In September 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by the Derg (Military Council), which led to political chaos in the country. The Derg very quickly came into conflict with all political forces. Separatist movements began to grow in the country, the strongest of which was the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). At the end of 1975, the WSLF operating in Somali-populated areas in the Ogaden attacked numerous government outposts in the region. Somalia supported the front from 1976 to 1977 by supplying arms and essential aid. In an effort to bring the situation in the country under control, the Derg appointed Mengistu Haile Mariam as head of state on 11 September 1977.

Nevertheless, the opponents of the Military Council were not subdued. Opposition forces continued their struggle for power. Developments in Ethiopia were closely watched by the Soviet authorities, who came to believe that it was in the USSR's interest to help Mengistu Haile Mariam expand the system. Mengistu Haile Mariam thus secretly approached the Soviet Union and accepted the offer of assistance¹⁰. At the same time, Ethiopian-American relations cooled. As a result of these events, the US military base and communications centre in Ethiopia were closed¹¹.

The diplomatic efforts of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the leader of Ethiopia, helped to undermine Mohammed Siyad Barre's (President of

⁹ J. A. Mubarak, *From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia: How an Economy Fell Apart*, Praeger, Westport 1996, pp. 38-39.

¹⁰ See: R. G. Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa the Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990, pp. 202-205.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 206.

Somalia) cooperation with the Soviet Union. Mengistu Haile Mariam went on an official visit to Moscow in 1977. The warm reception accorded him by the Soviet authorities greatly strengthened his position, also with the full support of the Soviet allies he declared open warfare against his opponents both internal and external.

The Second Ogaden War broke out in 1977. It was another unsuccessful attempt to annex the Ogaden¹². In this conflict, the Soviet authorities strongly supported Ethiopia. As a result, Mohammed Siyad Barre broke off relations with Moscow, seeking support and cooperation from the United States.

Almost all of Somalia's bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union had changed. At the start of the war, more than 1,000 Soviet military advisers and more than 2,000 Soviet-trained Somalis were in Somalia under previous political and military agreements. When the Soviet position changed and Ethiopian-Soviet relations strengthened, Somalia reacted by breaking the earlier agreements. It expelled military advisers and broke the agreement on the use of the Barbera naval base. It responded by having the Soviet bloc support Ethiopia by sending 1,500 military advisers and 1,600 Cuban troops to the area. This aid allowed Ethiopia to repel Somali attacks and Mohammed Siyad Barre announced a cessation of the war. In this struggle, Ethiopia was ultimately victorious¹³.

According to Ethiopian sources, the Somali army, at the start of the war (Somali troops entered the Ogaden on 13 July), numbered 70,000 troops supported by 40 aircraft, 250 tanks and other military equipment. Within a month, the Somalis, with the active assistance of the Western Somalia Liberation Front, had taken control of 60 per cent of Ogaden territory. The Ethiopian air force then attempted to repel the attack by gradually regaining the upper hand against the enemy. In addition to Soviet support, the Democratic Republic of Yemen, North Korea, Cuba and East Germany also announced training and military assistance to Ethiopia¹⁴. The People's Republic of China (PRC), and

¹² P. B. Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*, Hurst & Co Publishers, London 2000, pp. 299-300.

¹³ E. Goldstein, *Wars and Peace Treaties*, Routledge, London 1992, p. 170.

¹⁴ D. H. Shinn, T. P. Ofcansky, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*, Scarecrow Press, Lanham 2004, pp. 305-307.

Romania sided with Somalia. By September 1977, only 10% of the Ogaden was already under Ethiopian control. Nevertheless, the prevalence of Ethiopian air attacks on supply lines severely weakened Somali forces. In addition, the Ethiopian government even managed to recruit a gigantic 100,000-strong militia army¹⁵. This force, integrated with the regular army, was soon highly successful in recapturing another area of the Ogaden occupied by the Somalis. Following the withdrawal of Somali troops, the already smaller Western Somalia Liberation Front conducted sporadic, unsuccessful attacks in the Ogaden¹⁶.

During the fighting for the Ogaden, 8,000 Somali soldiers lost their lives. In addition, the Somalis lost $\frac{3}{4}$ of their armoured units and more than half of their air force. As a result of this war, some 400,000 people, in the early 1980s, had to emigrate from the Ogaden to Somalia and northern Kenya¹⁷.

In addition to the above-mentioned major events, there were also major or minor military clashes on the Ethiopian-Somali border in August 1982 and between 1998 and 2000. The roots of the conflicts date back to the 16th century, when Ibrihim ibn Ahmad al-Ghazi, known in Somali culture, waged religious wars against Ethiopia¹⁸.

Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict

The Ethiopian-Eritrean border war has a historical context. Eritrea was an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941. Following the defeat of the Italians in the Horn of Africa, and also in Eritrea, administration in the country was handed over to Britain until the Allies determined the country's further fate. The British administration lasted until 1952. It was intended to assist Eritrea, which was in transition, on its way to full independence. After the expiry of the British mandate, Eritrea

¹⁵ *Ethio-Somalia War*, <http://ethiopiamilitary.com/ethio-somalia-war/>.

¹⁶ D. Carment, P. James, Z. Taydas, *Who Intervenes: Ethnic Conflict and Interstate Crisis*, Ohio State University Press, Columbus 2006. p. 95.

¹⁷ E. Rediker, *Ogaden: A Microcosm of Global Conflict*, pp. 213-215, http://www.tcr.org/tcr/essays/EPrize_Ogaden.pdf.

¹⁸ *Ethio-Somalia War ...* .

was annexed to Ethiopia in the form of a federation, which lasted for 10 years. In 1962, Emperor Haile Selassie announced the abolition of autonomy¹⁹.

Eritrea became one of the provinces of Ethiopia. The activities of political parties, trade unions and the editing and publishing of newspapers were banned. Consequently, in the 1960s, Eritrean independence movements were born. The main reason was the discontent and opposition of Eritreans to the change of their status in Ethiopia.

After the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Mengistu Haile Mariam-led military government continued its brutal policy against the insurgents. Eritrea was the gateway to the sea, which was extremely important strategically for Ethiopia²⁰.

The guerrilla struggle for Eritrean independence lasted 30 years. The breakthrough came after the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam's government, to which all the country's political forces contributed, but mainly the Eritrea Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray Liberation Front (TPLF)²¹.

Eritrea formally broke away from Ethiopia in 1993 following the introduction of a referendum in which 99.8% of the population voted for independence. However, the borders were not clearly defined²².

Outbreak of war

The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea lasted from May 1998 to June 2000. It ranks as one of the largest wars in the history of the Horn of Africa²³. Badme, Tesnora and Zalemessa were the main areas of terri-

¹⁹ K. Shillington, *Encyclopedia of African History*, Vol. 1, A-G, Taylor and Francis Group, New York 2005, p. 490.

²⁰ D. Cornell, *Taking on the Superpowers: Collected Articles on the Eritrean Revolution (1976-1983)*, Vol. 1, Red Sea Press, Trenton 2003, pp. 49-52.

²¹ H. G. Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia*, University of California Press, Berkeley 2004, pp. 216-217.

²² K. Shillington, op. cit., p. 513.

²³ M. Phillips; J.-B. Carillet, *Ethiopia & Eritrea*, Lonely Planet, Footscray 2006, p. 40.

torial dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Different sources give different versions of the genesis and outbreak of this war.

According to UN sources, on 6 May 1998, Eritrean armed forces crossed the Ethiopian border and occupied the disputed territory of Badme which lies along the border with Eritrea. On the same day, Ethiopia responded with a massive attack to retake the city²⁴. Eritrea, maintaining that Badme was an integral part of Eritrean territory, announced a peaceful settlement of the dispute to a third party. In contrast, on 19 May 1988, Ethiopia denied statements by the Eritrean side that the disputed territory had ever belonged to Eritrea and demanded a complete return to the existing borders. Ethiopia made peace talks contingent on these conditions being met. On 3 June 1998, Eritrea accused Ethiopia of launching an attack in the south of Eritrea's hinterland and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. The parties continued to accuse each other thereby leading to an escalation of the situation and large-scale fighting. Eritrea demanded that the borders be fixed along the lines defined during the colonial period²⁵.

Ground troops on both sides fought on three fronts. The Ethiopians launched air attacks on Asmara airfield (the capital of Eritrea) destroying military installations. In retaliation, the Eritreans launched air attacks on the city of Mekele, capital of Tigray province in the north of the country. The airstrikes killed 55 civilians and wounded 136. Subsequent Eritrean air strikes on Adigrat forced many residents to flee their homes. The air strikes resulted in numerous civilian casualties on both sides. At the beginning of February in 1999, both sides assembled a huge ground force at the border. The number of soldiers involved in the fighting was estimated at 200,000 on both sides. By the end of the month in 1999, the number of war casualties in Eritrea reached 20,000. A similar number of war casualties were also reported on the Ethiopian side²⁶.

²⁴ T. Jaques, *Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: A Guide to 8500 Battles from Antiquity through the Twenty-first Century*, Vol. 1, 1 A - E, Greenwood Press, Westport 2007, p. 99.

²⁵ *Yearbook of the United Nations 1998*, Vol. 52, UN. Department of Public Information, UN, New York 2001, p. 145.

²⁶ P. Briggs, *op. cit.*, s. 40.

Table 1. Highlights of the border crisis between Eritrea and Ethiopia

Date	Event
20-21 April, 1997	Meeting between the Vice President of the Tigray Region (Ethiopia) and the Deputy Regional Administrator of Gash Barka Region (Eritrea) to discuss border issues, held in Shire, Tigray (Ethiopia).
22-27 June, 1997	The sub-committee, which was formed in accordance with the decisions in Shire, met to observe the 40 km border line; the committee found that not only in one place, but also in three other localities, a demarcation line had been drawn deep into Eritrean territory.
June 1997 (no exact date)	The administration of the Tigray region (Ethiopia) has banned the cultivation of land by Eritrean farmers beyond the 'unilaterally demarcated' line and the obligation of the residents (Eritreans) to leave these villages
18-19 July 1997	Ethiopian soldiers entered Eritrean territory (a 'unilaterally designated' area) and began patrolling and mass expulsion of Eritreans.
8 August 1997	Eritrean representatives arrived in Addis Ababa to discuss problems arising at the border, including developments in Adi Murug and Badme.
16 August 1997	Less than a month after the Adi Murug and Badme incident, President Isaias Afeworki (Eritrea) wrote a letter to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zen, formally protesting Ethiopia's actions and calling on the Prime Minister to take all necessary measures to end Ethiopia's incursions.
25 August 1997	President Isaias Afeworki sent another letter to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zen. This time, representing General Sebbat Efreem (Eritrea's Minister of National Defence), he proposed the creation of a joint border commission. The first meeting of this commission was scheduled for November 1997.
17 October 1997	The creation of a new map of the Tigray region (Ethiopia), on which Eritrea's colonial borders with Ethiopia were changed for the first time in almost a century.
6 May 1998	6 May 1998 Ethiopian troops clash with patrol units on the Eritrean border near Badme. Several of its members were killed. The incident caused a chain reaction on both sides. On 13 May 1998, the Ethiopian parliament declared a state of war with Eritrea. On 14 May, the Eritrean government called for peace and proposed that a neutral party investigate the circumstances that led to the incident.

Table 1 – cont.

Date	Event
14 May 1998	On 14 May 1998, the Eritrean government presented a 5-point peace plan and in it, among other things, the Eritrean government condemns the logic of the use of force and reiterates the view that border disputes of all kinds should be resolved only by peaceful and legal means and not by military means; conduct all negotiations and agreements in the presence and through third parties; and calls for the temporary demilitarisation of the borders.
14 June 1998	The governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia have accepted the proposal put forward by the US government for a total ban on airstrikes by both sides
26 June 1998	1998, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and refraining from further use of force. It called on Ethiopia and Eritrea to cooperate fully with the OAU and, in order to avoid any steps that could worsen the situation, urged both countries to guarantee the rights and security of each other's citizens. The resolution was tabled by the United States and supported by the United Kingdom, Costa Rica, Japan, Russia and Slovenia.
30-31 May 1998	The US and Rwandan governments have attempted to resolve the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia by presenting a four-point peace plan.
5 June 1998	On 5 June 1998 at 14:00 and 14:30 local time Ethiopian fighter jets launched an air attack on Asmara. The attack on Asmara airport (the capital of Eritrea) killed 30 people and a Zambian transport plane that was parked on the runway was damaged.
10 June 1998	The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), at its 34th summit in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
17 December 1998	The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Central Authority for Conflict Prevention, Governance and Resolutions opened its meeting in Ouagadougou. Some 20 heads of state and government attended the high-level meeting. An 11-point proposal for resolving the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia was developed.

Source: *Chronology of the Crisis Between Eritrea and Ethiopia*, <http://www.eritrea-chat.com/eritrean-true-report-about-the-conflict-between-ethiopia-1998-2000-a-chronology-crisis-haile-yehdego.php>.

Trial of the peace process

The United States and Rwanda presented a peace plan to resolve the border disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The reason for the two countries' involvement was to prevent further escalation of the war and to try to build lasting peace and stability in the region. After consulting with the warring parties and examining the details of the conflict, the US and Rwandan mediators presented, on 30-31 May 1998, a plan to resolve the crisis containing the following elements²⁷:

1. Both sides should commit to the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes, renouncing the use of force; are to take steps to reduce current tensions and agree on how to definitively define common borders on the basis of colonial-era treaties and the international law applicable to those treaties.
2. Deploy a small monitoring mission in Badme to reduce tensions in the area; withdraw Eritrean forces from Badme to their pre-6 May 1998 position; re-establish civilian administration in the area; investigate the events of 6 May 1998.
3. The demarcation of the border should be established on the basis of the colonial treaties and the international law applicable to these treaties; the demarcation of the borders should be carried out by a qualified technical team; the boundaries defined must be accepted and both parties must undertake to respect them; upon completion of the demarcation, the legitimate parties should exercise sovereignty over the territory concerned.

Both parties to the conflict should demilitarise the entire common border as soon as possible.

Ethiopia welcomed the peace plan positively, while the Eritreans took a negative stance as acceptance of the plan would have meant withdrawal from the areas they occupied.

The Organisation of African Unity also played an important role in addressing the border crisis. The OAU Action Plan was supported by the United Nations, the European Union and the United States. The

²⁷ U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998/ps980603.html>.

UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1227, which concerned a ban on the supply of arms to the warring parties. This happened after fighting resumed and the conflict escalated in February 1999.

The tragic and bloody war lasted more than two years. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives and also hundreds of thousands of residents on both sides of the border were forced to be displaced. Under pressure from international communities, the warring parties showed their willingness to cease hostilities for peace by signing ceasefire agreements. The ceasefire agreement was signed on 18 June 2000 in Algiers. Six months later, a comprehensive peace agreement was drafted, also in Algiers, for a complete cessation of hostilities and the establishment of an independent commission to settle border issues. The parties showed their willingness to work closely with the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity to implement the agreements. This agreement has given hope for stability and peaceful coexistence of the two peoples side by side within their borders.

In July 2000, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to monitor and observe compliance with the ceasefire between the two countries. The peacekeeping operation involved 4,000 troops from 40 countries around the world. After the peacekeepers were deployed, the two countries were separated by temporary demilitarised zones. In addition to ensuring the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, UN peacekeepers provide assistance for the return of people displaced by the war²⁸.

The border war cost a total of 70,000 casualties²⁹. According to other sources, 30,000 Eritreans and over 100,000 Ethiopians were killed³⁰.

²⁸ *Securing a Lasting Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea* by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations and Amara Essy, Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, <http://www.un.org/NewLinks/eebcarbitration/oped.htm>.

²⁹ *Półwysep Somalijski: tysiące nowych uchodźców?*, <http://209.85.135.132/search?q=cache:N5mOJY9a5lQJ:www.refugee.pl/%3Fmod%3Dknowbase%26path%3D602+wojna+mi%C4%99dzxy+etiopi%C4%85+a+erytre%C4%85+100+000+ofiar&cd=1&hl=pl&ct=clnk>.

³⁰ *Eritrea and Ethiopia, Continual Conflict*, <http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/eritrea-ethiopia.htm>.

The war ended in December 2000. Both sides agreed to settle the dispute through an international border commission. Two years later, the border commission issued a decision awarding the disputed area (Badme) to Eritrea. Ethiopia rejected the commission's ruling.

After a further 5 years of trying to find a mutually satisfactory settlement, the border commission concluded its work by upholding the 2002 decision as final. Eritrea declared victory, demanding that the international community recognise the demarcation as binding. However, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi rejected the commission's ruling, meaning a further unfinished border dispute or, highly likely at any time, a renewed war. As a result, the UN has deployed a 5,000-strong peacekeeping force, which is expected to have the effect of increasing regional stability and preventing a potential outbreak of war in the disputed areas between Ethiopia and Eritrea³¹.

The UNMEE peacekeeping mission between Eritrea and Ethiopia ended on 30 July 2008. The UN Security Council decided unanimously on the basis of Resolution 1827, after reviewing the situation on the ground, that the peacekeeping force could not effectively carry out its mandate. The reason for this is the dissatisfaction of Eritrea, which considered that the presence of international peacekeepers does not bring concrete benefits. As a result, Eritrea stopped the supply of fuel and food to the soldiers and observers of the United Nations Military Peacekeeping Mission. In addition, Eritrea banned observer mission convoys from crossing the border³².

Conclusion

Ethiopia shares its frontiers with 6 countries: Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti. It has border disputes with most of the above mentioned countries. However, the nature and the extent of

³¹ Ibidem.

³² UNMEE, <http://unmee.unmissions.org/>; *End of peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea*, http://www.psz.pl/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=12380.

the problem vary; based on the specific relations with individual country. This article focuses on the major Ethiopian wars of border with Somalia and Eritrea.

The politics of post-independence Somalia during the early 1960s was dominated by public opinion to unify all areas populated by ethnic Somalis into one country, to realize the concept of “Greater Somalia”. Somalia has border dispute with Ethiopia especially Ogaden, in the South East of the country. Somalia started the border war with Ethiopia in February 1964. The conflict was ended by fast and successful intervention of the Organization of African Unity.

The second war of Ogaden erupted in July 1977. Somalia decided to invade Ogaden, when internal political problems in Ethiopia were intensified, after emperor Haile Selasse was over thrown by the military. The Superpowers were also involved in the war; The Soviet Union and its allies supported Ethiopia and the United States, the Somali side. During the second war of Ogaden, about 8,000 Somali soldiers have been killed. In the aftermath of the war more than 400 000 civilians have been displaced. Ethiopia won both, the first and the second war of Ogaden.

The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the border dispute started in May 1998 and ended in December 2000. Tens of thousands of people have lost their lives in the conflict. Different sources have provided different numbers of victims of war on both sides. Approximately from 70,000 to 100,000 from the Ethiopian side and 30 000 Eritreans have lost their life. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations, the United States of America and other countries have actively involved in the peace process to stop the war. After two years of war, both parties agreed to form an independent boundary commission whose decision would be final and binding. In accordance with the treaty of Algiers, Eritrea accepted the April 2002 decision by an international Boundary Commission delimiting its borders with Ethiopia; but Ethiopia rejected it. The Security Council on 31 June 2000, by its resolution 1312 established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), to verify the cessation of hostilities Agreement and assist in planning peacekeeping. The Security Council of the UN unanimously adopted resolution 1827, on 30 July 2008, which termi-

nated the mandate of the United Nations mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia. This decision came after Eritrea imposed restrictions on UNMEE, which could not carry out its mandate tasks. So far, there is no solution for the disputed areas, which means a war can be erupted again at any time.

None of the border wars between Ethiopia and neighbouring states formally found an end in the form of final demilitarisation and demarcation of borders. The open wars with Somalia as well as with Eritrea have resulted in great loss of property, forced displacement of civilians and thousands of casualties. The negative effects of warfare, on a regional scale, will continue to be long and acutely felt and difficult to repair. The lack of willingness to resolve border disputes peacefully and the ease with which leaders of the region's states use force is a worrying development. Dialogue and the use of methods to peacefully resolve common border problems remains the only path without an alternative.

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Chapter 7

Conflicts of Interest Related to Expropriation and Sale of Land to Foreigners in Ethiopia

Introduction

This chapter presents the recent decades rapid increase of global demand for rich resources and cheap land available particularly in Africa which became attractive and popular among investors. Ethiopia and some governments in Africa have actively engaged in the process of controversial arable land transactions with foreign investors at the expense of their own farmers. The chapter focuses on the main issues of transfer of land to foreigners in Ethiopia during the administration of the Ethiopian People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (EPRDF), which dominated Ethiopian politics from 1991 to 2018, compared with similar events in Africa and other parts of the world. The analysis of this problem requires to put forward important questions to look for proper answers. The analysis of this problem raises important questions that need to be answered. Has the transfer of land to investors, which is often done by removing traditional users, farmers from their own lands, contributed to the poverty of farmers? Does this phenomenon have an economic rationale for the country's development? Does the long-term leasing or sale of land to foreigners create a new form of colonialism and permanent conflict? The largest share of long-term investment regarding land lease had taken place

in five administrative regions in Ethiopia - Afar and Amhara in the north, in central Ethiopia Oromia, Gambela and Nations, Nationalities in Southern regions of Nations (SNNPR). According to the investigation, generally the balance between small-scale and large-scale agriculture leaves a big question mark over the future livelihoods of small farmers in Ethiopia as well as other parts the world. Displacing the local farmers and focusing on the agricultural products intended exclusively for export without distribution in the local market are also pointed out as a serious social injustice. In Ethiopia like in some countries in Africa, the problem of land also caused a strong reaction in the society, and this problem will inevitably be one of the international issues to be resolved soon.

The global demand for abundant resources and readily available cheap land in the world, particularly in Africa, has increased dramatically in the last decades. Some governments in Africa have actively engaged in the process of farmland transactions with foreign investors, at the expense of their own farmers. This chapter mainly focuses on the issue of expropriation and sale of land in Ethiopia to foreigners in comparison to similar developments in Africa and globally.

General Overview of Ethiopian Land Policy

Land expropriation is often referred to as “global land grabbing” and refers to the seizure of agricultural land for commercial purposes in developing countries by foreign investors (state and private) in the production and export of food and crops processed for biofuels. The processes of organising and conducting production, exchange and capital flows on a global scale are linked to the globalisation of the economy. The origins and earlier phases of globalisation can be seen from the early 20th century. The first theoretical issue in this regard was imperialism, outlined by the British author John A. Hobson in his work *Imperialism: A Study*, published in 1902¹. The best-

¹ J. Atkinson Hobson, http://www.liberal-international.org/editorial.asp?ia_id=682.

known version of the concept of imperialism was propounded by communists, including Vladimir Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin. Imperialism as the highest phase of capitalist development and colonial expansion, direct conquest as well as indirect subjugation of weaker states². This situation today takes place in a different version, through cooperation with different governments around the world, but achieves similar results.

This applies to agricultural land transactions, which bring huge benefits to large investors, unfortunately at the expense of local residents above all in countries with questionable political institutions or undemocratic governments, as this is mostly done without consultation and consent of the local community.

Ethiopia is undoubtedly one of the leading countries practising the above-described activities of controversial land transfers to foreign corporations.

In Ethiopia, land is exclusively owned by the state. This was proclaimed in the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia. This constitution prohibits, also the sale or exchange of land, so it entitles citizens, both locals and foreigners only to land use rights. According to the Constitution and the Village Administration, farmers and pastoralists have the right to access private and communal land for free. Once they have gained access, peasants and pastoralists can retain their use rights on these lands indefinitely. They can also transfer their land use rights to family members, either by inheritance or by donation. Every rural landowner is entitled to a land certificate, which shows, among other things, the area of the plot, the purposes of the land use and the types of land in their use. Those who receive a record of possession can lease this land to other farmers or investors for a period of time determined by the Land Administration, transferring land use rights. Peasants and pastoralists cannot be displaced from the land they occupy, except when the government requires the land for public use. When farmers' agricultural land is required for public use, the government must notify the farmers in advance in writing, indicating the date by which the land must be abandoned and the amount of compensa-

² *Historia świata*, <http://historiaswiata.com.pl/wpis/80/>.

tion paid. In such cases, farmers can also be compensated by being able to purchase other land instead³.

Private investors, domestic as well as foreign, can acquire land use rights in Ethiopia under Ethiopian law only. Under this law, a foreign investor as defined by the Federal Investment Act, i.e. “foreigners or foreign-owned enterprises, after investing foreign capital in Ethiopia (...)”, can inherit their land use rights.

Paradoxically, they can also present their land use rights as collateral, unlike peasants or pastoralists who do not have such rights. Once land is obtained, foreign investors have the right to retain it until their lease expires.

The issues discussed above seem to show that farmers in Ethiopia are fully protected from the risks of agricultural policies. However, the policy of land expropriation and forced removal of peasants as well as pastoralists in recent years has raised many concerns, including depriving them of their right to use the land, which is often not in accordance with national law.

The current acquisition of agricultural land in Ethiopia is easier for foreign investors than for Ethiopian citizens themselves. As a result, many foreigners currently own vast tracts of agricultural land in various regions of the Ethiopian state⁴.

By handing over thousands of square kilometres of land to foreign investors on the cheap, the Ethiopian government promised farmers new jobs, improved national agricultural knowledge and poverty alleviation and food guarantees. However, critics take a different view. Indeed, the government has used forced displacement of the farming and pastoralist population. Contrary to promises, these populations were paid very low wages to perform work on the new farms, which also led to environmental degradation. Promises to improve infrastructure for the people deprived of their land were not kept. The government has argued in justification of its actions that the land belongs to the state. These actions show that the interests of the people

³ S. Mekonnen, *Rights of Citizens and Foreign Investors to Agricultural Land under the Land Policy and Laws of Ethiopia*, “Haramaya Law Review” 2012, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 34-38.

⁴ Ibidem.

have been completely ignored. It should be remembered that in Ethiopia, indigenous peoples have a customary right to use the lands on which they have lived for generations. In contrast, government officials often state the non-existence of any potential threats, e.g. Ethiopia's Minister of Agriculture, Tefera Deribew stated: "We want to develop large-scale agriculture in regions where we have enough arable land without harming the farmers living in those areas. This definitely supports the agricultural development of smallholder areas"⁵.

A farmer from the Oromia region in an interview with the IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks) news agency said: "Our land was taken illegally. Even if it is, we do not use the land for agriculture, we use the pastures for our cattle. Now we have very little pasture for our cattle. We don't know what will happen to us in the future". The violation of the rights of pastoralists states, Article 40(5) of the Ethiopian Constitution, which states "Ethiopian pastoralists have the exclusive right to land for grazing and cultivation". Among those affected and dispossessed of their lands are the Gambela pastoralist peoples. These are pastoralist communities whose livelihoods depend on pasture, land and water⁶.

The largest share of foreign investment in land acquisition takes place in Ethiopia in five administrative regions - Afar and Amhara in the north, Oromia in central Ethiopia, Gambela and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) in the south of the country. Indian companies are largely concentrated in the Gambela and Afar regions. For example, Karaturi Global is the largest investor in the Gambela region in palm oil, cereals and pulses, with crops grown over 300,000 hectares. Indian investment generally takes place in regions where the Ethiopian government offers additional tax incentives. Besides, only a few direct Indian investments have been identified in the Omo Valley in southern Ethiopia⁷.

⁵ *Humanitarian news and analysis a service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, <http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=92292>.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ *FAQs on Indian Agriculture Investments in Ethiopia*, Oakland Institute, <http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/faqs-indian-agriculture-investments-ethiopia>.

Table 1. Agricultural land transfer for domestic and foreign investors in Ethiopia 2002-2012.

Name of investor	Country/ source of origin	Region	Type of invest- ment	Land transfer/ (area in ha)	Registered capital (in mil- lion birr)	Lease of land (in mil- lion birr)
Adam	Ethiopia	SNNPR	cotton	18 516	323	2 925 528
Daniel Agricul- tural Deve- lopment Enterprise	Diaspora	SNNPR	cotton and cereal grains	5 000	65	790 426,60
Lucci Agricul- tural Deve- lopment PLC	Ethiopia	SNNPR	cotton	4 003	83	632 474
Mela Agri- cultural Deve- lopment PLC	Ethiopia	SNNPR	cotton	5 000	42	790 000
Rahwa	Ethiopia	SNNPR	cotton and cereal grains	3 000	14	474 000
Reta	Diaspora	SNNPR	cotton and cereal grains	2 137	13	337 740
Ruchi	India	Gambela	soya and beans	25 000	1 451	2 775 000
Tsegaye Demoze Agricul- tural Deve- lopment	Diaspora	SNNPR	cotton, sesame and soya	1 000	9	158 000
White Field	India	SNNPR	cotton	10 000	32	1 580 000
BHO	India	Gambela	edible oil and oil plants	27 000	918	2 997 000
Sannati	India	Gambela	rice	10 000	160	1 580 000
Verdanta	India	Gambela	tea	3 012	631	334 332
Shmporji	India	B/Gumuz*	pongamia (biofuel)	50 000	984	7 170 000

Table 1 – cont.

Name of investor	Country/ source of origin	Region	Type of investment	Land transfer/ (area in ha)	Registered capital (in million birr)	Lease of land (in million birr)
Keystone	Diaspora	B/Gumuz	horticulture and plants	431	66	307 134,91
CLC (Spentex)	India	B/Gumuz and Amhara	cotton	25 000	1 177	5 548 750,05
Access Capital	Ethiopia	B/Gumuz	sesame and seeds	5 000	61	3 288 750
Karuturi Agro Products PLC	India	Gambela	palm trees, cereals, rice and cane sugar	100 000	2 110	2 000 000
Saudi Star Agricultural Development	Saudi Arabia	Gambela	rice	10 000	37 640	300 000
Huana Dafengyuan Agriculture	China (PRC)	Gambela	sugar cane	25 000	2 973	3 950 000
Kehedam Trading	Diaspora	B/Gumuz	oilseeds	3 000	13	1 013 400
Dr. Tamie Hadgu	Diaspora	SNNPR	cotton and seeds	5 000	74	790 000
Bruhoye	Ethiopia	B/Gumuz	cotton, soya	5 000	60	960 000
ASKY Agricultural Development	Ethiopia	B/Gumuz	cotton	3 000	60	333 000
Tracon Trading Pvt. Ltd/ Co.	Ethiopia	B/Gumuz	cotton	5 000	61	1 972 500
Saber Farm PLC	India	Gambela	cotton and soya	25000	436	3 950 000

Table 1 – cont.

Name of investor	Country/ source of origin	Region	Type of investment	Land transfer/ (area in ha)	Registered capital (in million birr)	Lease of land (in million birr)
Getafan Mechnaized Farming	Ethiopia	B/Gumuz	cotton, fruit and oilseed crops	3 000	21	855 450
Tigabe Agro Industry	Ethiopia	B/Gumuz	cotton	3 000	49	697 500
Toren Agro Industries PLC	Turkey	Gambela	cotton and soya	6 000	1 000	948 000
AGROPE-ACE BIO ETH PLC	Israel	Somali	oil and cotton production	2 000	253	33 292 500
AL-MEHADI MATCH MARKS PLC	Pakistan	SNNP	matchwood	1 000	79	19 489 500
GASHAW BEZU TAKELE	Diaspora	B/Gumuz	cotton	3 000	44	333 000
GREEN VALLEY AGRO PLC	India	Gambela	cotton and others	5 000	171	555 000
HASH AGRO INDUSTRY PLC	Ethiopia	SNNPR	cotton	14 704	140	2 058
HORIZON PLANTATIONS PLC	Ethiopia	B/Gumuz	peanuts and others	20 000	1 630	3 160 000
JVL OVERSEAS PTE LTD	India	Gambela	cotton and others	5 000	74	790 000

Table 1 – cont.

Name of investor	Country/ source of origin	Region	Type of investment	Land transfer/ (area in ha)	Registered capital (in million birr)	Lease of land (in million birr)
MAMAY MIHRET NEGA	Diaspora	B/Gumuz	cotton	3 000	255	333 000
OMO VALLEY FARM COOPERATION P.L.C	Turkey	SNNPR	cotton	10 000	750	1 580 000
TIKIMT AGRICULTURAL PLC	Ethiopia	B/Gumuz	cotton	3 000	56	333 000

* B/Gumuz - Bienszangul-Gumuz.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ethiopia <http://www.moa.gov.et/web/amharic/144>.

For example, one-third of the fertile land of the Gambela region in western Ethiopia, has been leased by the multinational food production company, Karuturi Bangalur, for a period of 50 years. In this region, forests are being cut down in masse, swamps are being drained and rivers are losing their natural course, with whole villages being removed to make room for new flower farms, oil palm and rice plantations.

In an interview with The Guardian newspaper shortly after the land leasing in 2011, project manager Karmjeet Shekhon for Karuturi Global stated: “This is very good land, it’s quite cheap (...) We don’t have land like this in India”⁸. This problem also affects many other African countries. Liberia has reportedly signed concessions to foreign investors for almost 1/3 of the country’s territory in recent years. Half of the agricultural land from the Democratic Republic of the Congo

⁸ *Land grabbing in Africa: a review of the impact and the possible policy responses*, <http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/land-grab-phenomenon-threatens-africa-1.1271135>.

has been leased to grow crops, including palm oil for biofuel production. In northern Mozambique, land roughly the size of Switzerland and Austria combined has been leased by Brazilian and Japanese companies to produce soya and maize for export.

Critics question the wisdom of food production for foreign consumption by foreign corporations, in regions where many people suffer from hunger, especially when the transactions involve land from which local and small farmers are removed from their lands.

In Ethiopia, nearly 1.5 million farmers and pastoralists have been relocated from their lands to make room for new large-scale agricultural farms. According to Olivier de Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, the transfer of agricultural wealth is a new form of colonialism. Foreign states and corporations are trying to convince themselves that they are helping poorer countries to develop. According to O. de Schutter, their real motive is to use indigenous African resources to ensure their own food security: “Smallholder agriculture in African countries is threatened by large plantations designed to export agricultural products as commodities rather than food”⁹.

NGOs such as OXFAM, Human Rights Watch and the Oakland Institute argue that the real consequences of the takeover of agricultural land by large corporations have negative consequences. By preparing huge areas for foreign investors for the purposes of high-commodity food and biofuel production for export, Ethiopia has thereby violated its obligations under international law. By displacing hundreds of thousands of indigenous people, destroying their traditions, the environment, the Ethiopian authorities have thereby violated human rights and by doing so have made these people even more dependent on food aid than ever before¹⁰.

Since 2009, land from Ethiopia’s autonomous regions has been transferred to the Federal Land Bank, even though some regions did not want to hand over the land (at the time they had to accept the decision under pressure).

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ *Ethiopia - Land for Sale*, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleand-power/2014/01/ethiopia-land-sale-20141289498158575.html>.

Table 2. Investment areas of the Federal Land Bank under the control of the central government.

Regions of Ethiopia	Land area (in ha)
Amhara	420 000 (not confirmed)
Afar	409 678
Bienszangul-Gumuz	691 984
Gambela	829 199
Oromia	1 057 866
SNNP	180 625
Total	3 589 678

Source: D. Rahmato, *Land to Investors: Large-Scale Land Transfers in Ethiopia*, Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa 2011, p. 15.

The above figures concern the years 2009-2010, besides, the transfer of agricultural land to large investors is expected to increase from 0.5 million ha in 2011 to 2.8 million ha in 2013 and is estimated to reach 3.3 million ha in 2015. The allocation of agricultural land to investors in various parts of the state has been ongoing since the second half of 1990. Until the end of 2002, it mainly concerned local investors and the land allocated to investors was mostly small, less than 500 ha. Foreign investors began to show interest due to the publicity of investment in floriculture as the most profitable and lucrative market crop in Europe and the world. The years 2003-2007 were a *boom* period for cut flower exports including those from Ethiopia. Demand for agricultural land by investors, especially foreign investors, began to increase rapidly between 2006 and 2008, with applicants seeking access to large areas of agricultural land, e.g. 10,000 ha or more¹¹.

Data obtained from Ethiopia's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development show that between 1996 and the end of 2008, 8,000 land applications were approved by autonomous regions with a total area of 3 million ha.

Between 2003 and 2009, 1 million hectares of land were granted to around 500 foreign investors, either on their own or in *joint ventures*

¹¹ D. Rahmato, *Land to Investors: Large-Scale Land Transfers in Ethiopia*, Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa 2011, p. 12.

with local businesses. One of the largest foreign investments is Karuturi, a company based in Bangalore (India), which has been allocated 300,000 ha of land in the Gambela region. This land is allocated to foreign investors, where they outnumber domestic investors.

In 2009 and 2010, over 500,000 ha of land were allocated to investors by both the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Regions. The World Bank in 2010 estimated the total value of agricultural land transfers allocated to investors in Ethiopia between 2004 and 2008 at 1.2 million ha. Available data also indicates that by the end of 2015, agricultural land totaling almost 7 million ha will be transferred to investors, compared to 38% of agricultural land used by smallholder farmers in the country¹².

Lease Fee

The rent charged on agricultural land, was set out in the agricultural land regulations. Each region of Ethiopia has different land rent rates. Most regions determine the land rent depending on location, access to transport, markets, communication and banking services and whether it is to be used for irrigation or not.

Land close to urban centres and with adequate roads and other basic services, or benefiting from an irrigation system, has the highest rental value. The maximum rent is 135 birr (ETB) per hectare per year, which is primarily found in the Oromia region¹³.

Table 3. Maximum and minimum annual rental fees for agricultural land in selected regions of Ethiopia

Lease price of 1 hectare in birr*		
Region	Maximum price	Minimum price
Amhara	79,37	14,21
BeniShangul	25	15
Gambela	30	20

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibidem.

Table 3 – cont.

Lease price of 1 hectare in birr*		
Region	Maximum price	Minimum price
Oromia	135	70
SNNP	117	30
Tigray	40	30

*Birr is the Ethiopian currency, in 2009, 1 USD was 12.9 birr, in October 2010. , 16.35 birr, and in November 2014. 20.19 birr.

Source: D. Rahmato, *Land to Investors: Large-Scale Land Transfers in Ethiopia*, Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa 2011, p. 15.

These rents are “ridiculously” low by any standards, and even one Indian investor, who has just received a large piece of land in the west of the country, called these fees ‘free access’. Many foreign investors who have acquired land have been made happy by such low prices for huge tracts of fertile agricultural land. Rates are still stagnant despite the depreciation of the birr against all major currencies despite rising inflation in the state. Removing farmers from their own land and handing it over to investors does not make economic as well as social sense. Many farmers have had to work for these investors at very low and not decent wages.

Risks and Consequences of Land Expropriation

Despite a wave of media reports and some published studies, international agricultural land deals and their impact on the lives of landless people remain poorly understood. The adoption of vast areas of agricultural land by investors has major local implications and consequences for the future of agriculture worldwide.

The balance between small-scale and large-scale agriculture leaves a big question mark over the future of the livelihood of today’s small farmers. Besides, the export of agricultural products without distribution in the local market is a serious problem concerning social injustice¹⁴.

¹⁴ L. Cotula, S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard, J. Keeley, *Land Grab or Development Opportunity? Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa*, IIED/FAO/IFAD, London - Rome 2009, p. 15.

In some African countries, land expropriation has provoked a fierce public reaction. Namely, contracts agreed between the government of Madagascar and the South Korean company Daewoo, for a 99-year lease of almost half of the arable land for maize and palm oil, leading to conflict between the rural population and the state authorities. This agreement, providing only for production for export, is often cited as the cause of the 2009 coup that ousted President Marc Ravalomanana, where his successor Andry Rajoelina immediately canceled the planned deal¹⁵.

The contemporary wave regarding land deals in Africa is not the new investment in agriculture that millions of people expected as a hope for a better future. According to the organisation OXFAM¹⁶, in the race for land grabs, the poorest people are the most disadvantaged. Studies show that locals regularly lose out to the local elite of national or foreign investors; because there is no effective legal system to defend the interests of the most vulnerable. Companies and governments must take urgent steps to improve outcomes for land allocation rights and people living in poverty. OXFAM warns that the relationship between authorities, investors and local communities must be changed if investment is to contribute to food security guarantees rather than deprive local communities of their livelihoods¹⁷.

In recent years, these large investments have led to land expropriation, fraud, human rights violations, and the destruction of indigenous peoples' livelihoods. Without action by national and international organisations to defend the rights of people living in poverty, this problem could lead many poor families to an even worse situation, where they are often expelled from their own lands with little or no compensation. In African countries, as much as 227 million ha of land,

¹⁵ K. Thaler, *Large-Scale Land Acquisitions and Social Conflict in Africa*, Conference Paper for Discussion, Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue International Conference, New Haven, 14-15 September 2013, p. 2.

¹⁶ OXFAM is an international humanitarian organisation dedicated to fighting world hunger and helping in developing countries. OXFAM was founded in 1942 in the UK as the *Oxford Committee for Famine Relief*. See: <http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/history>.

¹⁷ *Land and Power OXFAM*, <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp151-land-power-rights-acquisitions-220911-summ-en.pdf>.

an area the size of Western Europe, is land that has already been sold or leased since 2001, mainly to foreign investors¹⁸. The leased land is often for food and biofuel production, which goes to a foreign market. Such activities are referred to as ‚land seizure’, ‚land grabbing’ or ‚land expropriation’. According to OXFAM, this refers to the indiscriminate purchase of land by foreign investors, where this phenomenon violates the following¹⁹:

- violates human rights, especially the equal rights of women;
- disregards the principles of freedom, the impact on prior and informed consent of land users, especially indigenous peoples;
- ignores the impact of social, economic and gender relations, and the environment;
- avoids transparent contracts, clear and binding commitments in employment and benefit sharing.

In the fight against hunger and poverty, small farmers play the most important role. Between approximately 50% and 80% of the population in developing countries depend on agriculture as often their primary source of livelihood. There is no doubt that investment in agricultural development is crucial. The commoditised global rush to farm land in developing countries, especially in Africa, raises many questions in this regard²⁰.

In terms of targeted investments by foreign investors, the following countries are at the top of the list among African countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa: Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

Table 4. Total area of land offers made between 2001 and 2011 worldwide in millions of hectares.

Continents	Land offers (in million ha)
Africa	50,7
Asia	19,3
Latin America	8,8

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ D. Milerová Prášková, *Land Grabs in Africa Land Grabs in Africa: A Threat to Food Security*, Prague Global Policy Institute - Glopolis, Prague 2012, p. 2.

Table 4 – cont.

Continents	Land offers (in million ha)
Other	1,1
Total	79,9

Source: D. Milerová Prášková, *Land Grabs in Africa Land Grabs in Africa: A Threat to Food Security*, Prague Global Policy Institute - Glopolis, Prague 2012, p. 2.

According to analyses, some companies from Asian countries (China, India and South Korea) and Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) are key investment players in agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa. Among these investors are also countries that depend on food imports, this makes these countries invest in agricultural production outside their borders, such as Egypt and Libya. Investors from the United States and the European Union primarily Italy, Norway, Germany, France, Denmark and the United Kingdom are also active. The main form of investment is long-term leasing of agricultural land. Lease terms range from 50 years to 99 years. Moreover, land is very cheap in Africa and land fees are not an important element in negotiations. In Ethiopia, a lease of 1 ha is generally between \$3 and \$10 per year of use²¹.

Participation of Public Investors

Public investors have participated in the process of land expropriation indirectly by implementing a strategy based on private market support to increase global food production. A good example is the involvement of one of the World Bank institutions, the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

For this purpose, the IFC has committed US\$75 million. It designed its largest capital investment in agribusiness to help create a fund that supports investment in world-class farm operators to increase global food supply. The question arises? Which operators should be supported to increase the global food supply? The IFC has chosen to sup-

²¹ Ibidem.

port the richest²². However, it should be remembered that this institution was set up more than half a century ago to combat the problem of global poverty by, among other things, providing low-cost loans to private companies in Third World countries. Its aim was to create opportunities for people to lift themselves out of poverty and increase their standard of living²³.

In recent years, many private sector financiers have focused on agricultural land as a strategic asset with significant returns. Assuming that financial use for food and energy crises and the belief that agricultural land prices will continue to rise in the future, private investors have triggered a wave of newly created investment structures and financial instruments over the past few years by acquiring land abroad.

For the same reason, aggressive capital inflows into agricultural land and agribusiness transactions have recently been expanding. This situation has also attracted a significant amount of resources from a number of multilateral organisations, as well as financial development institutions, such as the World Bank, IFC, European Investment Bank (EIB) and African Development Bank (AfDB), as well as financial agencies responsible for the development of individual countries. by “public” (i.e. member state) investors. These institutions act to provide financial, advisory, technical, legal and infrastructural support through which corporate programmes could improve their operations. It is not in the interests of expropriated farmers for foreign investors to take over agricultural land. Corporate investors are focused on exporting their products. The global rush for agricultural land poses a direct threat to rural economies and livelihoods, state reform programmes and international food security. Paradoxically, while governments are in a race to attract investors the expansion of corporate agriculture exacerbates insecurity by crowding out local producers. Besides, it undermines the ecological stability of local land and water resources and causes irreversible long-term consequences for economic and social structures in rural socie-

²² E. da Vià, *Development Opportunity?*, Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 6-8 April 2011, p. 15.

²³ *International Finance Corporation - instead of helping the poor... gives credit to billionaires*, <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/drukuj.html?wid=15297071>.

ties. Land expropriation is not simply the latest opportunity for speculative investment for quick, powerful profits; it is part of a longer process, a long-term plan to take control of the agricultural sector, at the expense of millions of small producers and land users²⁴.

In 2010, World Bank published in a report a number of irregularities related to land transfers. The report shows that bids are disproportionately cheap and entrepreneurs benefit from land resources often at the expense of farmers' lives and pastoralist communities. Focusing on large land transfers in 14 different countries over the period 2004-2009, the report was highly critical of most projects, including:

1. Ignoring the relevant legal procedures regarding land acquisition;
2. Displaced local people without compensation;
3. Crossing of areas not delegated to the developer;
4. Causing strongly negative gender effects;
5. Destructive effects on the environment;
6. Creating far fewer jobs than promised;
7. Leasing land for free or well below its actual value;
8. Exclusion of pastoralists and internally displaced persons from consultations on land acquisition.

The overall conclusion of the report was, therefore, that many investments have been a failure. Rather than generating sustainable benefits, investors' expectations often contributed to the loss of assets and left local people worse off than they would have been without these investments.

Conclusion

As indicated above, the large-scale takeover of land by foreign investors has resulted in massive displacement of farmers from farmland, which was the basis for the survival of the farmers themselves and their families. This has the potential to cause impoverishment and hunger for farmers and their families. Compensation from African governments is symbolic and not enough to buy food.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 4.

There is no adequate legal system to protect them from being expelled from their farms, and after displacement, farmers have sought compensation for all the damage they have suffered as a result of their displacement. Displaced farmers do not have the opportunity to buy land, nor are they qualified to seek alternative work. The issues heralded by the government that the poorest and farmers, who were supposed to be the recipients of the benefits, in reality became the victims; giving up their own land, they were forced to seek work on large farms as in the days of colonialism. The concept of displacing farmers and handing over land to foreign investors is not a moral, economic justification and, moreover, has not contributed to the living standards of the poorest farmers in Ethiopia.

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